Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions by Ardia, David S.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 1 Article 2
Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions
David S. Ardia
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol55/iss1/2
William & Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 55 NO. 1, 2013
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND INJUNCTIONS
DAVID S. ARDIA*
ABSTRACT
It has long been a fixture of Anglo-American law that defamation
plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; their remedies are solely
monetary. Indeed, it has been repeated as a truism: “equity will not
enjoin a libel.” This precept rests on one of the strongest presump-
tions in First Amendment jurisprudence: that injunctions against
libel and other kinds of speech are unconstitutional prior restraints.
But it may not be true, at least not anymore. 
Over the past decade, the Internet has brought increased attention
to the adequacy of the remedies available in defamation cases. Prior
to the widespread availability of digital publishing, most defamation
lawsuits in the United States involved claims against the mass
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media. These defendants were amenable, at least in theory, to the
threat of large damage awards and had professional and financial
interests in maintaining their reputations for accurate reporting.
Today, the defendants in defamation cases are more likely to be
bloggers or users of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. For
this new crop of defendants, the threat of money damages does not
appear to serve the same limiting function on their behavior.
Although the Supreme Court has never held that an injunction is
a permissible remedy for defamation, the past decade has seen a
veritable surge in injunctions directed at defamatory speech,
especially speech on the Internet. Despite this surge, courts have not
clearly articulated why injunctions are permissible under the First
Amendment and consistent with long-standing principles of equity.
As a result, many judges—and scholars—remain confused about the
availability and proper scope of injunctive relief in defamation cases. 
This Article challenges the widely held view that defamation law
does not countenance injunctions. In doing so, it presents the first
comprehensive analysis of more than two centuries of case law.
Reviewing these cases, it draws out the rationales, both constitu-
tional and equitable, for the no-injunction rule. The Article concludes
that although courts should be cautious when granting injunctions,
a limited form of injunctive relief would be constitutional and
consistent with equitable principles if it were limited solely to false
statements on matters of private concern that a court has
found—after full adjudication—are defamatory. It then describes
how such a remedy could be structured so that it would be both
effective and compatible with the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been a fixture of Anglo-American law that libel
plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief; their remedies are
solely monetary.1 Indeed, it has been repeated as a truism: “equity
will not enjoin a libel.”2 This precept rests on one of the strongest
presumptions in First Amendment jurisprudence: that injunctions
against libel and other kinds of speech are unconstitutional prior
restraints.3 But it may not be true, at least not anymore. 
Over the past decade, the Internet has brought increased
attention to the adequacy of the remedies available in defamation
cases.4 Prior to the widespread availability of digital publishing,
most defamation lawsuits in the United States involved claims
1. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 989, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“To enjoin
any publication, no matter how libelous, would be repugnant to the First Amendment ... and
to historic principles of equity.”) (internal citations omitted); Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
29 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (“The decisions in our State and Federal courts have
firmly established the legal principle that no injunction may issue to prevent or stop the
publication of a libel.”); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (stating that
a court cannot issue an injunction “without infringing upon the liberty of the press, and
attempting to exercise a power of preventive justice which ... cannot safely be entrusted to any
tribunal consistently with the principles of a free government”); Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Knott, (1875) 10 Ch.App. 142 at 145 (Eng.) (refusing to grant an injunction and stating, that
“not merely is there no authority for this application, but the books afford repeated instances
of the refusal to exercise jurisdiction”). Courts in the United Kingdom began departing from
this rule in the late nineteenth century. See Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation,
Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 708 (2008) (noting that “in 1878
England began cutting back on the traditional no-injunction rule and abandoned it by the end
of the century”).
2. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9:85 (2d ed. 2012) (“There is a traditional
maxim that ‘equity will not enjoin a libel.’”); see also 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:
LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 10:6.1 (4th ed. 2010) (“One principle long adhered
to in defamation cases is that courts will not enjoin libels.... The absoluteness of the rule is
crucial.”); BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 13.3.3A (2d ed. Supp. 2006) (“Because of
constitutional law’s antipathy toward prior restraints, courts are rarely willing to consider
such injunctions.”).
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Defamation includes both libel, which covers defamatory statements that are written
or communicated in such a way that they persist similar to the printed word, and slander,
which generally covers defamatory statements published orally or in a manner that is not
likely to be preserved in a physical form or broadcast widely. See SACK, supra note 2, at xliii,
§§ 2:4.1-.2. The distinctions between the claims are not germane to the present analysis, so
this Article uses the general label of defamation.
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against the mass media. These defendants were amenable, at least
in theory, to the threat of large damage awards and had profes-
sional and financial interests in maintaining their reputations for
accurate reporting. Today, the defendants in defamation cases are
more likely to be bloggers or users of social media, such as Facebook
and Twitter. For this new crop of defendants, the threat of money
damages does not appear to serve the same limiting function on
their online behavior. 
Not surprisingly, the so-called “no-injunction rule”—which
essentially says that judges cannot prevent reputational harms that
arise from defamatory falsehoods, and that they may order only
money damages after the harms occur—has faced considerable
criticism. As Professor Douglas Laycock observed, such a rule
“sounds absurd to people who are neither lawyers nor economists.”5
And even to many lawyers, the no-injunction rule often seems
illogical.6 
Although the Supreme Court has never held that an injunction is
a permissible remedy in a defamation action, the past decade has
seen a veritable surge in injunctions directed at defamatory speech,
especially speech on the Internet.7 Despite this surge, courts have
not clearly articulated why injunctions are permissible under the
First Amendment and consistent with long-standing principles of
equity. As a result, many judges remain confused about the
availability—and proper scope—of injunctive relief in defamation
cases. In a number of cases, for example, judges have issued
astonishingly broad injunctions, including injunctions that ordered
defendants to never again mention the plaintiff’s name,8 or to
5. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE viii (1991). This
view is not entirely surprising, given that many speech-protective doctrines strike the
layperson as irrational; freedom of expression “does not come naturally to the ordinary citizen,
but needs to be learned.” THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 12
(1970).
6. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 164-65; William O. Bertlesman, Injunctions
Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation, 59 KY. L.J. 319, 323 (1971); George E. Frasier,
An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504, 508-09
(1968); Estella Gold, Does Equity Still Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or Slander?, 48
BROOK. L. REV. 231, 262-63 (1982); Joseph R. Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115, 118-21 (1923); Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation
and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 648 (1916). 
7. See infra Part III.
8. See, e.g., Baker v. Haiti-Observateur Group, No. 12-CV-23300-UU (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6,
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remove entire websites because a single page contained defamatory
content.9 Such injunctions raise obvious problems under the First
Amendment’s prior restraint doctrine, yet these judges seem
oblivious to the constitutional ramifications of their orders, viewing
injunctive relief as just another remedy available to tort plaintiffs. 
As Professor Eugene Volokh recently remarked, uncertainty
about the availability of injunctive relief in defamation cases is one
of the most important issues in First Amendment law today.10 It is
an issue, however, that has not received significant attention by
legal scholars.11
This Article aims to rectify this deficiency by analyzing more than
two centuries of case law involving injunctions in defamation cases.
In reviewing the cases, it identifies the rationales, both constitu-
tional and equitable, for the no-injunction rule. It also argues that
in some circumstances, the rule ought to be put aside so that a court
can issue a narrowly tailored injunction to prevent further harm to
2013) (order granting permanent injunction), vacated, Baker v. Joseph, No. 12-CV-23300-UU,
2013 WL 1458665 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013); Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-CV-386-SEB-JMS,
2009 WL 1035265 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2009) (entry granting preliminary injunction); Cochran
v. Tory, No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002) (granting
permanent injunction), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005); Apex Tech. Grp., Inc. v. Doe, No. MID-L-
7878-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
9. See, e.g., Bluemile, Inc. v. Yourcolo, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-497, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62178, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2011); In re Davis, 334 B.R. 874, 889 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005),
rev'd in part, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D. Ky. 2006); Burfoot v. May4thCounts.com, No. CL10–2735
(Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 21, 2010), withdrawn, 80 Va. Cir. 306 (Apr. 22, 2010).
10. Eugene Volokh, Oral Statement at the Association of American Law Schools’ Section
on Defamation and Privacy (Jan. 5, 2013). 
11. Professor Volokh offered some insight into the issue in his influential work with Mark
Lemley on injunctions in intellectual property cases, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 176-77
(1998) (arguing that the rule against preliminary injunctions in defamation actions should
apply in copyright, trademark, right of publicity, and trade secret cases), as have a few other
scholars, who have examined various aspects of the no-injunction rule. See Bertlesman, supra
note 6, at 320 (explaining that equity has failed to result in just outcomes in defamation law);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 166-67
(2007) (expressing the belief that injunctions are unconstitutional prior restraints); Michael
I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition of Prior Restraint,
52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1087-88 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court for failing to define
prior restraints); Siegel, supra note 1, at 663 (exploring the history of civil and criminal
liability for defamation and the origins of the prior restraint doctrine); Christina E. Wells,
Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2000) (detailing the confusion in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
injunctions).
2013] SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND INJUNCTIONS 7
a plaintiff who is suffering continuing injury from defamatory
speech. In addition, it addresses the vexing question of whether an
injunction directed at defamatory speech online has any chance of
actually being an effective remedy. 
In our increasingly networked world, defamatory speech may be
beyond the power of a court to enjoin.12 All speech now has digital
echoes, whether neighborhood gossip shared on Facebook, archived
news articles indexed and searchable through Google, or snippets of
broadcast footage redistributed on YouTube. As Justice Thurgood
Marshall remarked in the Pentagon Papers case, “A court of equity
will not do a useless thing.”13 Perhaps a court order enjoining the
continuation of a press run might have been effective at preventing
the spread of defamatory speech in a pre-Internet world, but speech
now radiates—and persists—in ways that would have been
unimaginable only a quarter century ago.14
Part I begins by examining the remedies available to plaintiffs in
defamation cases, finding that there is frequently a gap between
what plaintiffs want and what they can realistically achieve. For
nearly all defamation plaintiffs, their only available remedy is
monetary damages. But money is not what these plaintiffs want
most. They want vindication, and they want the defendant to stop
12. See David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 314 (2010) [hereinafter
Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World] (noting that judicial remedies are largely ineffective
at dealing with reputational harms).
13. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(rejecting the government’s efforts to enjoin The New York Times and The Washington Post
from publishing a classified study of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam).
14. The recent dispute in the United Kingdom over a “super injunction” issued against
British media companies ordering them not to identify or report on a famous soccer player
who was allegedly having an extramarital affair with a reality television star illustrates the
ineffectiveness of these injunctions. See Peter Preston, Twitter and Wikileaks Have Made A
Mockery of the Courts, THE OBSERVER (May 22, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk
/media/2011/may/22/twitter-wikileaks-mockery-of-the-courts. As The New York Times
reported, “[T]ens of thousands of Internet users have flouted the injunction by revealing his
name on Twitter, Facebook and online soccer forums, sites that blur the definition of the press
and are virtually impossible to police.” Claire Cain Miller & Ravi Somaiya, Free Speech on
Twitter Faces Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at B1. Citing the ineffectiveness of the
injunction, a British Member of Parliament mentioned the player’s name, Ryan Giggs, on the
floor of Parliament, and British media outlets were then free to report it. See Eben Harrell,
The Great British Battle Between Privacy and the Press, TIME (May 24, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2073851,00.html. 
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defaming them. Yet as recent cases show, those goals can be elusive,
especially when the defamatory speech is disseminated on the
Internet.
Part II explores the historical antecedents for the no-injunction
rule and identifies the reasons courts initially adopted—and
continue to invoke—the rule. A survey of more than 242 defamation
decisions reveals that the no-injunction rule is based on both
constitutional and equitable concerns about the power of govern-
ment to silence speech. Modern courts most often cite the First
Amendment’s prior restraint doctrine as a reason to deny injunctive
relief, but the no-injunction rule was firmly ingrained in Anglo-
American law long before the U.S. Constitution was ratified.
Although the First Amendment has a lot to say on the question of
injunctions in speech cases, the no-injunction rule is also based on,
among other rationales, respect for the role of juries in free speech
controversies, a general preference for legal rather than equitable
remedies, and skepticism about the effectiveness of speech injunc-
tions. 
Nevertheless, as Part III shows, judges have increasingly granted
injunctions in defamation cases, often without considering their
constitutionality or consistency with long-standing principles of
equity. A review of the case law reveals that at least fifty-six
decisions have granted or affirmed an injunction directed at
defamatory speech, with an especially sharp increase in such cases
after 2000.15 Although the number of injunctions is still small
relative to the total number of cases in which injunctive relief is
requested, a more permissive attitude toward injunctions is clearly
emerging. Described by some courts as the “modern approach,”16
they take the view that judges may order injunctive relief if there
15. Of the fifty-six decisions granting or affirming injunctive relief, thirty-one were issued
after January 1, 2000. See infra note 189. This follows the trend other scholars have noted
with regard to the granting of injunctions generally, which appears to have increased
throughout the twentieth century. See Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law
Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 347 (1981) (“[C]ontemporary judges
grant more injunctions than their predecessors.”); Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REV. 994, 996 (1965) (“The expanding role of the injunction is partly due to the
attractiveness of so flexible a remedy in a modern society with expanding regulation of
complex economic and social affairs.”).
16. See, e.g., Wagner Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160 (D.N.M. 2012); Hill
v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Ky. 2010).
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has been a finding of defamation and the injunction is limited to
speech adjudged to be defamatory. Part III scrutinizes the decisions
granting or affirming injunctive relief and develops a taxonomy for
evaluating whether the injunctions are narrowly tailored, finding
that in more than three-quarters of the decisions, courts issued an
injunction that restrained speech that had not been found to be
defamatory.
Part IV concludes by considering whether the no-injunction rule
still makes sense today. It proposes that, although courts should
continue to remain cautious when granting injunctions, a limited
form of injunctive relief would be constitutional and consistent with
equitable principles if it were limited solely to false statements on
matters of private concern that a court has found—after full
adjudication—are defamatory. It then describes how such a remedy
might be structured so that it would be both effective and compati-
ble with the First Amendment.
I. REPUTATIONAL HARMS AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
When an individual or organization believes its reputation has
been harmed, a common response is to file a defamation lawsuit.
Defamation, which encompasses both libel and slander,17 is a
dignitary tort directed at remedying harm to a plaintiff’s reputation
caused by false statements of fact.18 As a product of state law, the
elements of a defamation claim vary, but generally a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant published a false and defamatory state-
ment concerning the plaintiff to a third party; that the defendant
acted negligently or with actual malice when publishing the
statement; and that the statement is actionable, either because it
caused special harm, per quod, or irrespective of special harm, per
se.19 
Although this may seem like a straightforward cause of action,
defamation lawsuits are complex and difficult for plaintiffs to win.20
17. See generally supra note 4 (defining defamation).
18. See Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World, supra note 12, at 277-78. 
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); see also discussion infra Part
IV.A.1.
20. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488-90
(1991); Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World, supra note 12, at 304-05; Lyrissa Barnett
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Moreover, defamation law does not impose liability for every
statement that harms reputation. The law places a number of
obstacles in the path of an aggrieved plaintiff.21 And even if the
plaintiff succeeds in the end, her victory is often pyrrhic. As
discussed throughout this Article, defamation plaintiffs are typically
entitled only to money damages. But money is not what many
plaintiffs want most.22 
A. The Changing Face of Defamation Litigation
Although defamation is one of the oldest torts in the common
law,23 it has not been static. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court
constitutionalized the tort of defamation by proclaiming that even
false speech was deserving of some First Amendment protection.24
This led to extensive substantive and procedural changes, imposed
by the Court to ensure that speakers have the “breathing space”
they need to engage in robust public discourse.25 For example, the
Court requires defamation plaintiffs to prove, in addition to falsity,26
that the defendant was at fault when he published a defamatory
statement.27 More recently, defamation law took on a decidedly
Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996);
David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation,
87 VA. L. REV. 503, 520 (2001).
21. See Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World, supra note 12, at 314-15.
22. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
23. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 3 (1986) (“The common law crime of libel can claim a long and broad ...
ancestry.”).
24. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964).
25. Id. at 271-72 (“[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to
survive.’”) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
26. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
27. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (requiring that
private figures in matters of public concern must prove at least negligence on the part of the
defendant); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (requiring that public officials suing for libel prove
that the defendant acted with actual malice). It remains an open question whether the First
Amendment requires that private figures in matters of private concern must prove falsity and
at least negligence on the part of the defendant. See Ruth Walden & Derigan Silver,
Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First Amendment Matter in Private Figure-Private
Concern Defamation Cases?, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 34-39 (2009) (discussing the confusion on
this issue and arguing that private figures should be required to prove at least negligence in
all cases). 
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medium-specific aspect when Congress passed § 230 of the Commu-
nications Decency Act, which granted operators and users of
websites and other interactive computer services broad protection
from defamation claims based on the speech of third parties.28
Not only has defamation law undergone doctrinal evolution, the
nature of defamation litigation has also changed. In the 1980s, 70 
percent of all libel actions in the United States involved claims
against the mass media.29 Today, bloggers, users of social media,
and “citizen journalists” are more often the targets of defamation
claims.30 In fact, so few defamation cases have been filed against the
mass media in the past five years that several of the nation’s
leading media lawyers have suggested that libel law is dead.31 For
example, George Freeman, vice president and assistant general
counsel at The New York Times, says that for the first time in his
twenty-nine years at the Times there are no active domestic libel
suits.32 
28. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137-38
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230). In deceptively simple language, section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006); David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior
or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 379 (2010) [hereinafter Ardia,
Intermediary Immunity]. The impact of section 230 is discussed infra Part I.B.
29. See DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 133 (1992).
It is exceedingly difficult to find and catalog every defamation case filed; as a result,
assessments of the total number of such suits can only be approximations. Many lawsuits do
not result in published decisions, nor do they appear in the news.
30. See, e.g., Dan Frosch, Venting Online, Consumers Can Land in Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2010, at A1; Debra Cassens Weiss, As Sites Like Yelp Increase in Popularity, More
Consumers Get Sued for Defamation, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 6, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/as_sites_like_yelp_increase_in_popularity_more_consumers_g
et_sued_for_defam/.
31. See John Koblin, The End of Libel?, THE NEW YORK OBSERVER (June 9, 2010, 1:23
AM), http://observer.com/2010/06/the-end-of-libel/ (quoting prominent First Amendment
attorney Floyd Abrams, Time Inc. general counsel Robin Bierstedt, and New York Times
assistant general counsel George Freeman). But see Eric P. Robinson, The End of Libel? Or
Just Libel Trials?, BLOG L. ONLINE (June 11, 2010), http://bloglawonline.blogspot.com/20
10/06/end-of-libel-or-just-libel-trials.html (stating that focusing on lawsuits pending against
media companies is not an accurate indication of the total number of libel cases).
32. Koblin, supra note 31.
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Although there are no comprehensive studies of defamation
litigation in the United States,33 anecdotal evidence indicates that
defamation claims are actually increasing.34 This is because
plaintiffs are filing their lawsuits against a different type of
publisher. Media lawyers who represent or study online publishers
have seen a substantial increase in libel lawsuits filed against
bloggers and users of social media. A database of libel lawsuits
against bloggers maintained by the Media Law Resource Center, for
example, revealed a 216 percent increase in cases filed between
2006 and 2009.35 And in a 2008 study at Harvard’s Berkman Center
for Internet & Society, researchers cataloged more than 280 civil
lawsuits that had been filed in the previous ten years against
bloggers and other online publishers, ranging from copyright
infringement claims against celebrity-gossip bloggers to defamation
claims against operators of hyper-local journalism sites.36
It is not just the defendants who are different in today’s defama-
tion cases. There also has been a shift in the types of plaintiffs who
are filing defamation claims. In past decades, the typical defamation
plaintiff was a public official or public figure.37 This makes intuitive
33. Several researchers have done limited empirical studies, primarily in the 1970s and
1980s. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 4-5
(1987) [hereinafter BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS]; Randall P. Bezanson, Libel
Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226,
226-27 (1985) [hereinafter Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation]; Marc
A. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 795, 798,
829-31 (1981) [hereinafter Franklin, Suing Media for Libel]; Marc A. Franklin, Winners and
Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 459, 497-
501[hereinafter Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why].
34. See, e.g., Frosch, supra note 30, at A1; David Ardia, Bloggers and Other Online
Publishers Face Increasing Legal Threats, POYNTER (Sept. 22, 2008, 11:19 AM),
http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/top-stories/91639/bloggers-and-other-online-publishers-
face-increasing-legal-threats/ [hereinafter Ardia, Legal Threats]; Defamation Lawsuits
Abound, LAWYERS.COM (2011), http://communications-media.lawyers.com/libel-slander-
defamation/Defamation-Lawsuits-Abound.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
35. See James C. Goodale, Communication and Media Law: Can You Say Anything You
Want on the Net?, 242 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (2009) (reporting on the MLRC data). A similar increase
in lawsuits also appears to be occurring outside the United States. See Online Defamation
Cases in England and Wales ‘Double,’ BBC NEWS UK (Aug. 26, 2011, 1:03 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14684620 (“The number of court cases brought by people who
say they have been defamed online has more than doubled in a year.”).
36. See Ardia, Legal Threats, supra note 34. 
37. See Franklin, Suing Media for Libel, supra note 33, at 798-99, 807 (finding that of 291
reported libel cases filed against the media between 1977 and 1980, more than two-thirds of
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sense; media companies tend to report on individuals and organiza-
tions that are prominent in society. When this reporting impugns
their reputation, such parties typically have the financial resources
and access to legal counsel necessary to bring a defamation claim
against a well-financed media company.
Today, given the ease with which information is published and
shared online, many defamation plaintiffs are not so well known.
They are what defamation law calls private figures.38 They are
plaintiffs like Kirk Burbage, who filed a defamation lawsuit against
his brother Chad for creating a website with the family name and
falsely stating that Kirk had abused their mother and fraudulently
secured an undeserved inheritance,39 and Edward Saadi, a
Lebanese-American lawyer who sued the creator of a blog called
“Biggest Loosers” [sic] for falsely stating, among other things, that
he was “mentally unstable” and a “criminal.”40
Although these private figure plaintiffs are more likely to win
their defamation cases because, unlike public officials and public
figures, they do not shoulder the heavy burden of proving that the
defendant acted with actual malice,41 they still face the hard reality
the identifiable plaintiffs were public officials, business managers, government employees,
professionals, or commercial corporations).
38. See Walden & Silver, supra note 27, at 3 (observing that private figure defamation
cases “account for a significant proportion of the defamation suits filed each year”). Private
figures are those who are not public figures, and public figures are determined by reference
to “the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the
public’s attention.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). A person “may
achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and
in all contexts” or may only be “a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Id. at 351.
39. See Burbage v. Burbage, No. 03-09-00704-CV, 2011 WL 6756979, at *1-2 (Tex. App.
Dec. 21, 2011). A jury awarded Mr. Burbage nearly $10,000,000 in compensatory and
exemplary damages, and the trial court permanently enjoined his brother from publishing
statements like those at issue in the suit. Id. 
40. Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07-CV-1976-T-24-MAP, 2008 WL 4194824, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 9, 2008). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Saadi on all counts of his
defamation claim and awarded him $30,000 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in
punitive damages. See Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07-CV-01976-T-24-MAP, 2009 WL 3617788, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2009). The judge then granted Mr. Saadi’s motion for a permanent
injunction, ordering the defendant to remove certain Internet postings about the plaintiff that
the jury found were defamatory. Id. at *3.
41. A finding of actual malice requires proof that the defendant published the
defamatory statement with “knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). There are no
comprehensive studies of the success rates of different types of plaintiffs in defamation cases.
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that their legal remedies are limited. Mr. Burbage and Mr. Saadi
both succeeded in convincing a jury to impose liability. Both won
thousands of dollars in damages, yet they still sought injunctions
ordering the defendants to remove the defamatory statements from
the Internet and to refrain from making similar statements in the
future. Trial judges in both cases granted this relief, but the Texas
Court of Appeals overturned the injunction in Mr. Burbage’s case,
concluding that “defamatory speech is not sufficiently injurious to
warrant prior restraint.”42 
B. Irreparable Injuries and Inadequate Remedies
Tort law aspires to provide plaintiffs with a complete remedy for
every injury.43 The remedies available to a specific plaintiff,
however, will vary depending on the nature of her claims.44 Accord-
ing to one of the leading treatises on remedies, “The two most
common remedies are judgments that plaintiffs are entitled to
collect sums of money from defendants and orders to defendants to
refrain from their wrongful conduct or to undo its consequences.”45
Most tort plaintiffs request money in the form of compensatory and
punitive damages, which are considered to be “legal remedies.”46
When a plaintiff asks the court to order the defendant to refrain
from specified conduct or to perform an affirmative act, she seeks an
“equitable remedy.”47
Nevertheless, in an analysis of defamation and related claims filed against “media
defendants” between 1980 and 1996, Professor David Logan found that claims brought by
plaintiffs who were public figures or public officials were dismissed at a very high rate of 85
percent. See Logan, supra note 20, at 509-10. In that same study, private figure plaintiffs did
nearly 20 percent better in avoiding dismissal. See id. at 510.
42. Burbage, 2011 WL 6756979, at *10. The Texas Court of Appeals did, however, leave
the jury award intact. Id.
43. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.9, at 43 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that
courts seek to “make whole all relevant legal harm”).
44. “A remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant who has been wronged or is about
to be wronged.” DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (3d ed. 2002).
45. See id.
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 979, 1407-08 (9th ed. 2009) (“A remedy historically available
in a court of law, as distinguished from a remedy historically available only in equity.”).
47. Equitable remedies include specific performance, partition, quiet title, trusts,
guardianship, and injunctions. See Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1642, 1643-44 (1992).
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Naturally, a remedy that prevents harm altogether is the most
complete remedy for a plaintiff. For that reason, plaintiffs often
request an injunction, “equity’s premier remedy,”48 in addition to
money damages. Unlike compensatory damage awards, however,
which plaintiffs are entitled to upon presenting adequate proof of
liability, plaintiffs have no right to an injunction: “the grant of an
injunction is always discretionary with the court, and in each case
the injunction order, if granted, will be tailored to arrive at an
equitable result under the circumstances.”49 Moreover, under
general principles of equity a judge must first “determine the
adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable relief.”50
If a court believes that money damages provide an adequate
remedy, it will not consider granting an injunction.51
Given the law’s preference for legal remedies, there is often a gap
between what plaintiffs want and what is available to them. The no-
injunction rule widens this gap in defamation cases by making the
general preference for money damages a veritable edict.52 As a
result, money damages are typically the only remedy available to
defamation plaintiffs.53 Yet research has shown that money is not
what defamation plaintiffs want most. A study conducted in the
1980s by Professor Randall Bezanson found that only 20 percent of
plaintiffs sued to obtain money as compensation for their
reputational harms.54 Instead, Professor Bezanson’s research
48. Id. (“The injunction is modern equity’s premier remedy; it began in obscurity, dividing
business between two courts and protecting property, grew into bumptious adolescence as a
tool for enterprise to wield against its employees, and achieved the present stage of its growth
facilitating judges’ efforts to assure constitutional rights.”). The term “injunction”
encompasses any “court order commanding or preventing an action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
855 (9th ed. 2009). This includes temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
permanent injunctions, and similar court orders directed at expressive conduct. See id.
49. Monica E. McFadden, Provisional and Extraordinary Remedies, 2 LITIGATING TORT
CASES § 13:3 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2012) (citing Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 363 U.S. 528 (1960)).
50. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992). 
51. See id. 
52. See infra Part II.
53. A plaintiff can, of course, negotiate a retraction or correction as part of a settlement
of the case. The few studies, however, that have looked at settlement rates in defamation
litigation found that defamation cases rarely end in settlement. See Bezanson, Libel Law and
the Realities of Litigation, supra note 33, at 228 (reporting that approximately 15 percent of
libel cases settle).
54. Id. 
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revealed that what libel plaintiffs desire most is a correction or
retraction.55 
The irony for those who suffer reputational harm is that money
is an especially inadequate remedy for defamation. This is because
reputational injuries are not readily translatable into monetary
relief; money can neither restore a diminished reputation nor make
a plaintiff’s emotional distress go away.56 Furthermore, because of
the procedural protections available to libel defendants,57 a plaintiff
must incur substantial legal costs to see a defamation lawsuit
through to completion, but “[v]ery few libel plaintiffs suffer enough
provable pecuniary loss to justify litigating” their case.58 
The inadequacy of monetary damages is made all the more
apparent when defamatory speech is published online. In our
increasingly networked world, online speech invariably passes
through the hands of countless intermediaries who distribute, host,
and index the billions of webpages, e-mails, and social media posts
that make up our digital lives.59 These intermediaries, however, are
largely immune from defamation liability because of § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act,60 which grants operators of websites
and other interactive computer services broad protection from
defamation claims based on the speech of third parties,61 including
protection from injunctive relief.62 
This leaves defamation plaintiffs in the unenviable position of
being able to sue only the initial speaker or publisher of the
55. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 33, at 24 (finding that 71
percent of the plaintiffs said they would have been satisfied with a correction or retraction).
56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 944 cmt. b (1977) (commenting that
money cannot compensate for loss of “personal reputation”); LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 165
(“Both because the thing lost is irreplaceable and because the loss is hard to measure,
damages are a seriously inadequate remedy for defamation.”).
57. See infra Part II.B.2.
58. Anderson, supra note 20, at 542.
59. See Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 28, at 383-84. 
60. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
61. See Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 28, at 409-12. 
62. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir.
2000); Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). But
see Giordano v. Romeo, No. 09-68539-CA-25, 2010 BL 318373, at *1-2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 28,
2010) (granting temporary restraining order directed at website operator), withdrawn, No.
09-68539-CA-25, (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2011) (dismissing claim against website operator under
section 230).
2013] SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND INJUNCTIONS 17
defamatory speech, even when an online content provider such as
Facebook or Google is continuing to make the information available
to others.63 Unless these online intermediaries voluntarily remove
the defamatory speech, a court cannot force them to do so.64 As a
result, injurious falsehoods can live indefinitely on the Internet,
waiting to be pulled up and recycled by a search engine.65 Even for
those plaintiffs who ultimately achieve some legal vindication, the
genie cannot be fully put back into the bottle. 
Perhaps in the days when media companies made up the majority
of defendants in defamation cases, a plaintiff’s need for injunctive
relief was less acute. Pre-Internet communications technology
provided a relatively ephemeral stream of information from the
media. Newspapers had a shelf life of fewer than twenty-four hours.
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. There are a number of policy reasons section 230 protects online
intermediaries. See, e.g., Ardia, Intermediary Immunity, supra note 28, at 389-92 (discussing
how section 230 reduces the likelihood that online intermediaries will excessively censor
speech of their users); Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE
NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293 (Berin Szoka & Adam
Marcus eds., 2010) (“[C]onsumer review websites can motivate consumers to share their
opinions and then publish those opinions widely—as determined by marketplace mechanisms
(i.e., the tertiary invisible hand), not concerns about legal liability.”); H. Brian Holland, In
Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities of Modified
Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 395-96 (2008) (“[I]ndirect liability reduces incentives
to develop self-help technology, such as location or identity tracking software and user-end
filters, the development of which was one of § 230’s primary policy goals.”). But see Rebecca
Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 986, 1002-05 (2008) (concluding that section 230’s blanket immunity for
intermediaries fails to take into account circumstances in which the relative interests and
incentives of speakers and intermediaries justifies imposing responsibility on the
intermediary); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 330-31, 340 (2011) (arguing that intermediaries should not
receive immunity when they are acting with the incentives of an original speaker or when the
form of liability at issue is uniquely applicable to intermediaries rather than original
speakers).
64. See, e.g., Bobolas v. Does, No. CV-10-2056-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 3923880, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 1, 2010) (refusing to enjoin GoDaddy.com because it was not an agent of the
defendant); Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 915-16 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (refusing to
enjoin third-party website operator under FED. R. CIV. P. 65), aff’d, 630 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.
2010). 
65. The largest of these online repositories is the Internet Archive, a non-profit digital
library that contains over 240 billion web pages archived from 1996 onward. See INTERNET
ARMING: WAYBACK MACHINE, http://www.archive.org/web/web.php (last visited Sept. 21,
2013). As part of its indexing process, Google Search maintains cached versions of web pages
for an indeterminate period. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 4:77 (2006 & Supp.
2012).
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Broadcasts simply disappeared into the ether. Although some media
sources were physically archived in libraries—or later in proprietary
electronic databases—defamatory statements did not persist or
remain in the public’s view for very long. Today, the lifespan of a
defamatory statement is essentially infinite. 
Not surprisingly, defamation plaintiffs are frustrated with the
remedies available to them. And as Part III of this Article reveals,
so are many judges. 
II. THE NO-INJUNCTION RULE IN DEFAMATION CASES 
The no-injunction rule has been a fixture of Anglo-American law
for more than three centuries. Well before the First Amendment
was ratified, it was taken as a given by judges and lawyers that
injunctions, including permanent injunctions following trial, were
not permissible remedies in defamation actions.66 The rule’s lineage
can be traced to the backlash that arose from England’s infamous
Star Chamber, which “served as an unhealthy hybrid of legislature
and court,” issuing laws and trying those accused of libel or slander
while acting “both as Judges and Jurors.”67 
Given the indelible mark that English censorship left on the
American colonists, it should come as no surprise that the no-
injunction rule appears quite forcefully in American cases not long
after the nation was founded.68 The first such published decision
66. See THOMAS STARKIE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLANDER, LIBEL, SCANDALUM
MAGNATUM, AND FALSE RUMOURS 3 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1813) (“[C]ommunications
concerning reputation cannot be [ ] prohibited.”); Note, The Restraint of Libel by Injunction,
15 HARV. L. REV. 734, 734 (1902) (“For one hundred and fifty years there has existed a
tradition having the force of absolute law that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin a libel.”).
67. Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 IND.
L. REV. 295, 299 (2001). In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, defamation claims fell
exclusively within the purview of ecclesiastical courts. See R. C. Donnelly, History of
Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99, 100-03. At some point thereafter, the Star Chamber took
over the trial of libel claims and declared that libel was a criminal offense. See Brief for
Historians Alfred L. Brophy et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tory v. Cochran,
544 U.S. 734 (2005) (No. 03-1488), 2004 WL 2582553, at *11 [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae
of Historians].
68. See, e.g., Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. Ch. 1839); STARKIE, supra note
66, at 3.
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was the 1839 New York case of Brandreth v. Lance.69 In Brandreth,
Chancellor Reuben Walworth wrote that a court cannot issue an
injunction without “attempting to exercise a power of preventive
justice which ... cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal consis-
tently with the principles of a free government.”70 If a court were to
enjoin libelous speech, he warned, it would mark a dangerous return
to the days of English censorship:
The court of star chamber in England, once exercised the power
of cutting off the ears, branding the foreheads, and slitting the
noses of the libellers of important personages. And, as an
incident to such a jurisdiction, that court was undoubtedly in the
habit of restraining the publication of such libels by injunction.71
The following subsections explore the historical antecedents for
the no-injunction rule and elucidate the reasons courts initially
adopted—and continue to invoke—the rule. An examination of more
than 242 decisions addressing injunctive relief in defamation cases
reveals that the no-injunction rule is based on both equitable and
constitutional concerns about the power of judges to silence speech.72
In more than three-quarters of these decisions, courts refused to
grant injunctive relief, citing one of four reasons for doing so: (1) the
court did not have the power to issue an injunction directed at
defamatory speech; (2) money was an adequate—and
preferred—remedy for the injured plaintiff; (3) an injunction would
not be effective in providing relief to the plaintiff; or (4) an injunc-
tion directed at defamatory speech would be an unconstitutional
69. 8 Paige Ch. at 24.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id. (internal citations omitted).
72. The author conducted a search on Westlaw and Lexis for decisions in which a court
addressed a party’s request for an injunction directed at defamatory speech. The following
search terms were used: (defamation libel slander) /p (injunction enjoin gag). This list was
then supplemented with additional decisions found by examining citing references and news
searches. After eliminating irrelevant decisions, the author reviewed a total of 242 decisions
through March 15, 2013. It is very likely that a number of decisions, especially in state trial
courts, were not identified by these searches. Like other studies attempting to empirically
examine case law, the exclusion of some unpublished decisions may bias the results to the
extent that there is a systematic difference between available and unavailable decisions. See
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1884-87 (2005).
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prior restraint.73 Of course, courts sometimes relied on more than
one of these reasons, or offered no justification, when denying
injunctive relief.
A. Equitable Limitations on Injunctive Relief
When American courts initially invoked the no-injunction rule,
the reason most often cited was the conviction that a court of law
did not have the power to issue an injunction. Due to the historical
division between courts of law and courts of equity, common law
judges originally lacked the authority to grant any equitable relief.74
When the Crown abolished the Star Chamber in 1641, English
common law courts began to hear defamation claims.75 Because
these courts had no power to grant injunctions, and courts of equity
lacked the authority to adjudicate claims for defamation, the only
remedy available for defamation was money damages at law.76 
In the United States, this same division of power between courts
of law and courts of equity existed until 1938, when enactment of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure formally merged law and
equity jurisdiction in the federal courts.77 Merger in most states
followed shortly thereafter.78 The no-injunction rule, however,
continued to be invoked by both state and federal courts. As several
of the nation’s leading legal historians noted in an amicus curiae
73. See id.
74. “Equity practice arose during the thirteenth century ... when English courts were
rigidly attached to the writ system,” which left many injured parties no recourse but to
“petition the King’s chancellor for special relief.” Anthony DiSarro, Freeze Frame: The
Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the Substantive Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47
GONZ. L. REV. 51, 55 (2012). 
75. See Brief Amici Curiae of Historians, supra note 67, at *12. 
76. See Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 389 (1886) (“If a court of equity could interfere and
use its remedy of injunction in [libel] cases, it would draw to itself the greater part of the
litigation properly belonging to courts of law.”); Brief Amici Curiae of Historians, supra note
67, at *12.
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (1938) (amended 2007) (“There shall be one form of action to be
known as ‘civil action.’”).
78. See John J. Kircher & Christine M. Wiseman, 2 PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 20:2 (2d ed. 2012) (“The reform that merged the two systems in individual states
was inaugurated by New York in 1948 and nearly all of the other jurisdictions have
subsequently followed suit.”). But see Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1643 (“Merger of law and
equity is incomplete; in most of our state systems, some parts of the field are considered
permanently ‘equitable jurisdiction.’”).
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brief they filed in the Supreme Court’s most recent defamation
injunction case, Tory v. Cochran, “the unavailability of injunctive
relief for defamation came to be considered an integral part of a free
press” in the United States.79 
Indeed, American judges were quick to dismiss requests for
injunctions directed at defamatory speech, and the earliest decisions
almost uniformly did so on the basis that the court had no jurisdic-
tion to grant equitable relief of any kind.80 Judges continued to deny
requests for injunctions targeting defamatory speech, however, long
after law and equity courts had merged in most jurisdictions in the
United States, stating that they had no authority to grant such
79. Brief Amici Curiae of Historians, supra note 67, at *13. For a discussion of Tory v.
Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005), see infra Part II.B.
80. See Citizens’ Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171
F. 553, 557 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1909); Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 706 (C.C.D. Or. 1900); Kidd
v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 776 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Balt. Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95, 95
(C.C.D. Mass. 1886); Palmer v. Travers, 20 F. 501, 502 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Willis v.
O’Connell, 231 F. 1004, 1009 (S.D. Ala. 1916); Dailey v. Super. Ct. of S.F., 44 P. 458, 460 (Cal.
1896); Reyes v. Middleton, 17 So. 937, 939 (Fla. 1895); McFarlan v. Manget, 174 S.E. 712, 712
(Ga. 1934); Bell & Co. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 65 Ga. 453, 459 (1880); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic
Sewing Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70, 74 (1873); Christian Hosp. v. People ex rel. Murphy, 79 N.E. 72,
74 (Ill. 1906); Allegretti Chocolate Cream Co. v. Rubel, 83 Ill. App. 558, 565 (1898); Everett
Piano Co. v. Bent, 60 Ill. App. 372, 378 (1895); Raymond v. Russell, 9 N.E. 544, 544 (Mass.
1887); Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69, 70 (1873); Flint v. Hutchinson
Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 805 (Mo. 1892); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163,
165 (N.Y. 1902); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1839); Singer v. Romerrick
Realty Corp., 5 N.Y.S.2d 607, 607 (App. Div. 1938); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, & Heath,
Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff’d, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 1947); League for
Peace with Justice in Palestine v. Newspaper P.M., 65 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1946);
Judson v. Zurhorst, 20 Ohio Cir. Dec. 9, 11 (1907), aff’d, 85 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1908); Balt. Life
Ins. Co. v. Gleisner, 51 A. 1024, 1024 (Pa. 1902); Houston v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 132
S.W.2d 903, 906-07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Strang v. Biggers, 252 S.W. 826, 827 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923); Mitchell v. Grand Lodge Free & Accepted Masons of Tex., 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1909). But see Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (asserting that
the rule that equity would not protect purely personal rights was known chiefly by its breach
and could be regarded as a fiction).
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relief.81 Many judges also remarked that it would be a usurpation of
the jury’s role if they were to do so.
1. Maintaining a Check on Judicial Power
Respect for the role of juries in free speech controversies played
a seminal part in the adoption of the no-injunction rule by American
courts. The aphorism that “equity will not enjoin a libel” was
essentially an assertion that a judge, acting alone, could not censor
speech, and that juries were a necessary bulwark against govern-
ment encroachment into fundamental liberties.82 One of the key
distinctions between courts of law and courts of equity was that
juries were empaneled in the former but not in the latter.83 For
example, in Citizens’ Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light
& Water Power Co., the court refused to enjoin a libel and stated: 
Defendant has a right to have the truth or falsity of the issue
determined by a jury trial as at common law. That it cannot get
in a court of equity. A person cannot be enjoined from doing any
act unless it is fairly apparent the act is wrongful, or the person
sought to be enjoined has no right to do that act. How can a
court of equity be satisfied where the right lays in the matter of
the alleged false statements? It cannot try the question for itself,
or determine the right in advance of the law court.84
81. See Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll. of Med. v. Woodward, No. 10-10978, 2010 WL 5185075,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2010); Kessler v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 236 F. Supp. 693, 698
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff’d, 341 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1964); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F.
Supp. 376, 378 (D.D.C. 1957); Birnbaum v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 17 F.R.D. 133, 139 (N.D. Ill.
1953); Weiss v. Weiss, 5 So. 3d 758, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Rodriguez v. Ram Sys., Inc.,
466 So. 2d 412, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail,
Wholesale & Dep’t Store Emps. of Am., 79 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ill. 1964); Krebiozen Research
Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 134 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1956); Prucha v. Weiss, 197 A.2d 253
(Md. 1964); Rosenberg Diamond Dev. Corp. v. Appel, 735 N.Y.S.2d 528, 528 (App. Div. 2002);
Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 166 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392 (App. Div. 1957); Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390
P.2d 882, 883 (Okla. 1964); Kyritsis v. Vieron, 382 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964);
Kwass v. Kersey, 81 S.E.2d 237, 243 (W. Va. 1954).
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
83. See Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1644-45.
84. 171 F. at 556; accord Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. at 806; Balt. Life Ins. Co.,
51 A. at 1024.
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In fact, the expanding role of juries in civil and criminal cases
tracked the increasing protections Americans saw as essential to
freedom of speech and of the press. One of the many criticisms of the
Star Chamber was its lack of a jury. When common law courts
began hearing libel claims, the inclusion of a jury offered an
important limitation on the government’s power to censor speech.
Under English common law, however, the jury was initially limited
to deciding the question of whether the defendant published the
statements the plaintiff sued upon.85 Jurors had no role in determin-
ing whether the speech was defamatory or what relief the plaintiff
should receive.86
Such a limited role for the jury did not sit well with colonial
Americans. The trial of John Peter Zenger demonstrates this quite
clearly. Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, had
been a leading proponent of a free press when he was put on trial for
seditious libel on August 4, 1735.87 After the judge ruled that truth
was not a defense and that it was the judge’s exclusive province to
determine if a printed statement “make a Lybel,” he instructed the
jury that its only job was to decide if Zenger had printed the
material in question.88 Zenger’s attorney, Andrew Hamilton,
conceded that his client had published the material, but implored
the jury to make its own determination of guilt, “as Men who have
baffled the Attempt of Tyranny.”89 When the jury returned a verdict
of not guilty, “there were three Huzzas in the Hall which was
crowded with people.”90
The Zenger jury’s unwillingness to cede power to the judge
became a powerful rallying cry both for the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury91 and for the expansion of
the jury’s role in libel cases,92 which now encompasses determina-
85. See Meyerson, supra note 67, at 306.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 318-19.
88. Id. (quoting FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 47, 60 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1966) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF THE PRESS]).
89. Id. (quoting FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 88, at 59).
90. Id. (quoting FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 88, at 61).
91. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 874 (1994).
92. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 40 (1955) (asserting that
the colonists had learned from the sedition trials that this essential power of the people to
talk about political issues can be easily destroyed by their rulers unless the question of
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tions of falsity, fault, and injury. “It became an article of faith for
those in the colonies that the jury was an essential buffer against
abuses of authority, whether by governors, parliaments, or judges.”93
As the historian Michael Meyerson observed: “Liberty in America
was seen as protection from, not by, colonial judges.”94
Indeed, juries play several essential roles in defamation cases. As
a threshold matter, the jury must determine whether the defama-
tory meaning the plaintiff ascribes to the speech at issue is the way
others would understand that speech.95 Although this might seem
like a straightforward inquiry, whether a statement has caused
reputational harm cannot be determined solely by reference to the
words themselves. “Because harm to reputation is a socially con-
structed injury, a court must measure its effects by the ‘attitudes,
beliefs, and prejudices of the relevant community.’”96 The jury’s
function in defamation cases, therefore, is “to act as a tribune of the
people; to be a popular institution with veto power over government
sanctions for speech.”97 
2. A Preference for Legal over Equitable Remedies 
The law’s antipathy toward injunctions in defamation cases is
also rooted in the longstanding view that legal remedies are prefera-
ble over equitable remedies.98 This principle is so ingrained in our
legal system that the Supreme Court has stated, “[I]t is axiomatic
punishing talk is decided by plain citizens on a jury).
93. Meyerson, supra note 67, at 319; see also Siegel, supra note 1, at 698 (“[I]n the
eighteenth century, there was a growing, and by the century’s end, dominant aversion to
entrusting speech and press controversies entirely to judges operating without the constraint
of a jury.”).
94. Meyerson, supra note 67, at 320; see also Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 776 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1886) (noting that the no-injunction rule was premised on the right to trial by jury); State ex
rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 745 (1882) (refusing to issue an
injunction and warning “[u]nder ... a subservient or corrupt judiciary, the press might be
completely muzzled, and its just influence upon public opinion entirely paralyzed”). 
95. See, e.g., MacLeod v. Tribune Pub. Co., 343 P.2d 36, 41 (Cal. 1959).
96. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World, supra note 12, at 296 (quoting Lidsky, supra
note 20, at 25). Examples of how reputational injury is societally constructed can be seen in
defamation claims that are based on assertions that the plaintiff was a communist, a negro,
or a homosexual; such terms were at one point considered to be defamatory, but that largely
is not the case today. See id. at 295-300. 
97. Siegel, supra note 1, at 729.
98. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1 (1978).
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that a court should determine the adequacy of a remedy in law
before resorting to equitable relief.”99 Although this view is attribut-
able, at least in part, to the historical division between courts of law
and courts of equity, the preference for legal remedies persists
today.100
By the mid-twentieth century, fewer courts were interposing a
lack of equity jurisdiction as a reason for denying injunctive relief.
Instead, they began to rely on the more general equitable principle
that a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief if she has an
adequate remedy at law.101 In Texas, for example, courts assume
that money damages are an adequate remedy for defamation unless
the speech sought to be enjoined includes a threat of harm to
another.102 Some judges also describe this reason for denying
injunctive relief in terms of a plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate
“irreparable injury,”103 which is simply another way of saying that
99. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1992).
100. See id.; see also FISS, supra note 98, at 1.
101. See Oorah, Inc. v. Schick, No. 09-CV-00353(FB)(JO), 2012 WL 3233674, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012); Allen v. Ghoulish Gallery, No. 06CV371NLS, 2007 WL 1555739, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2007); Freedom Calls Found. v. Bukstel, No. 05CV59460(SJ)(VVP), 2006
WL 845509, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2006); Ameritech v. Voices for Choices, Inc., No.
03C3014, 2003 WL 21078026, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2003); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d
309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Tilton v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 827 F. Supp. 674, 681 (N.D. Okla.
1993); Ga. Soc. of Plastic Surgeons, Inc. v. Anderson, 363 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Ga. 1987); Basarich
v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Everett Piano Co. v. Bent, 60 Ill. App.
372, 378 (1895); Daugherty v. Allen, 729 N.E.2d 228, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Greenberg v.
Burglass, 229 So. 2d 83, 83 (La. 1969); Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 951 So. 2d 247, 262 (La.
Ct. App. 2006); Wolf v. Harris, 184 S.W. 1139, 1141 (Mo. 1916); Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Allen, 469 P.2d 710, 711 (N.M. 1970); Ashinsky v. Levenson, 100 A. 491, 493 (Pa. 1917); Frick
v. Stevens, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 6, 28 (C.P. Ct. Cumberland Cnty. 1967); Cullum v. White, No. 04-
09-00695-CV, 2011 WL 6202800, at *13 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2011); Perez v. Dietz Dev., LLC,
No. 122157, 2012 WL 6761997, at *1 (Va. Dec. 28, 2012); Kwass v. Kersey, 81 S.E.2d 237 (W.
Va. 1954).
102. See, e.g., Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983);
Brammer v. KB Home Lone Star, L.P., 114 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. App. 2003).
103. See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 679-80 (3d Cir. 1991); McGath v. Hamilton
Local Sch. Dist., 848 F. Supp. 2d 831, 839 (S.D. Ohio 2012); Allen v. Quest Online, LLC, No.
CV-11-138-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 4403674, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2011); Bobolas v. Does,
No. CV-10-2056-PHX-UGC, 2010 WL 3923880, at *3 & n.2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2010); Bynog v.
SL Green Realty Corp., No. 05CIV.0305WHP, 2005 WL 3497821, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
2005); Hammer v. Trendl, No. CV02-2462(ADS), 2003 WL 21466686, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
2002); Evans v. Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 867 (Ct. App. 2008); Cohen v. Advanced Med.
Grp. of Ga., Inc., 496 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. 1998); Pittman v. Cohn Cmtys., Inc., 239 S.E.2d
526, 528 (Ga. 1977); Richter Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors’ Union, 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 45, 46
(Franklin C.P. 1890).
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a plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law.104 Both approaches
ultimately function as a means of channeling plaintiffs toward
monetary relief and away from equitable remedies, such as injunc-
tions.
Rather surprisingly, when courts have held that a plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law, the content of the defamatory speech
appears irrelevant to their conclusion; they engage in little analysis
of how the plaintiff could be made whole through existing legal
remedies. In fact, courts have stated that a plaintiff has an ade-
quate remedy even when there are serious questions about the
defendant’s ability to pay damages105 or the defamatory conduct is
continuing to cause harm.106 A review of the cases reveals that
courts have denied injunctions in a wide variety of circumstances,
including cases in which the defendant police department was
continuing to display the plaintiff’s photograph in its “rogues’
gallery” after criminal charges were dropped;107 the defendant was
publishing a circular that falsely stated that the plaintiff attorney
was a “[s]hyster egomaniac ... [who had made] deliberately false
statements” in legal proceedings;108 and the plaintiff’s mother-in-law
was slandering her to the plaintiff’s husband so as to alienate his
affections.109
Perhaps not surprisingly, many commentators find the suggestion
that legal remedies are adequate to repair reputational harms
troubling, seeing monetary remedies as clearly insufficient and
viewing a court’s reliance on them as masking an antipathy for
104. See United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974) (“[I]nadequacy
of available remedies goes only to the existence of irreparable injury.”); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (“[T]hese two contentions are
here closely related, if not identical.”).
105. See, e.g., Willis v. O’Connell, 231 F. 1004, 1014 (S.D. Ala. 1916) (“[I]f this be a sound
principle we must conclude that a rich man is allowed to freely utter libels, subject only to
action for damages and criminal prosecution in a court, where he can have his rights passed
upon by a jury; whereas the poor man is deprived of a trial by jury because he is poor, and
subject, I may say, to the summary injunctive process of chancery. Such cannot be the law.”);
Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1158 (Pa. 1978) (“[T]he insolvency of a defendant does
not create a situation where there is no adequate remedy at law. In deciding whether a
remedy is adequate, it is the remedy itself, and not its possible lack of success that is the
determining factor.”).
106. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
107. Owen v. Partridge, 82 N.Y.S. 248, 249 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
108. Gariepy v. Springer, 48 N.E.2d 572, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943).
109. Devine v. Devine, 90 A.2d 126, 127 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952).
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injunctions. Douglas Laycock, who has written a cogent critique of
the irreparable injury rule,110 concludes that “because the legal
remedy is almost never adequate,” the rule obscures the real
reasons judges make remedial choices.111 Because “damages cannot
replace a reputation once lost or erase emotional distress once
suffered,” Professor Laycock asserts that money damages are a
grossly inadequate remedy and therefore the irreparable injury
requirement should be easy for a plaintiff to meet.112 Yet, as he
points out, courts do not typically grant such relief. Instead, the no-
injunction rule limits libel plaintiffs “to less effective remedies
because we fear over enforcement of rules against tortious or
criminal speech.”113 Although Professor Laycock believes that
plaintiffs should be able to choose their preferred remedy, he
concedes that courts do—and should—refuse to order an injunction
when other interests outweigh the plaintiff’s interest.114 According
to Professor Laycock, “Such interests include burdens on the
defendant, the court, or the public, and countervailing policies of
substantive law.”115 
The preference for legal remedies also reflects an affinity for
juries. Given that juries typically do not play a role in awarding
equitable relief, claimants could request an equitable remedy in
order to deprive their opponents of a jury trial.116 Long-standing
principles of equity serve to limit this form of strategic behavior.117
“Judges administer the irreparable injury rule, with its preference
for legal remedies, to sort legal from equitable in ways that protect
a litigant’s right to have legal actions heard by a jury.”118
110. LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 237-43. After analyzing several hundred judicial decisions
purporting to apply the irreparable injury rule, Professor Laycock concluded: “The irreparable
injury rule almost never bars specific relief, because substitutionary remedies are almost
never adequate. At the stage of permanent relief, any litigant with a plausible need for
specific relief can satisfy the irreparable injury rule.” Id. at 23.
111. Id. at 161. 
112. Id. at 165 (footnote omitted).
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 266.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 213-14. In a number of cases, plaintiffs did just that.
117. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
118. Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1645; see also id. at 1645 n.12 (“Through our national
history, the prevailing sorting mechanisms for legal and equitable remedies have expressed
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Lest we think that equitable principles no longer hold sway now
that courts of law and equity have merged, two recent decisions by
the Supreme Court, albeit not in the defamation context, affirm that
“well-established principles of equity” remain a guide for courts
evaluating injunctive remedies.119 Among those equitable principles
is the instruction that courts should determine the adequacy of a
remedy at law before entertaining equitable relief and the admoni-
tion that, even when equitable relief is appropriate, a court should
not order a party to do “a useless thing.”120
3. Concerns About the Efficacy of Speech Injunctions
It may very well be that an injunction directed at defamatory
speech is a useless thing. Judges face formidable challenges when
drafting injunctions that will achieve a plaintiff’s purposes without
being overbroad or underinclusive. And even a well-crafted injunc-
tion will face significant enforcement problems, both in terms of a
court’s jurisdictional limitations and the practical problems of
ensuring compliance.121 Speech is notoriously difficult to restrain,
especially when the topic relates to a matter of public interest.122 As
Professor Doug Rendleman observes, “An injunction stops conduct
only as well as a stop sign halts a car; the defendant must apply the
brakes and obey.”123
Indeed, among the reasons judges provide for refusing to grant
injunctive relief in defamation cases are the difficulties they face in
tailoring an injunction to the plaintiff’s specific needs and the heavy
administrative and enforcement burdens that accompany equitable
the preference for civil juries.”).
119. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (instructing that traditional
principles of equity must be taken into account when evaluating permanent injunctions in
patent cases); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008)
(reversing preliminary injunction against Navy’s use of sonar and cautioning that “[a]n
injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as
a matter of course”).
120. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring);
see also Mitchell v. Chambers Constr. Co., 214 F.2d 515, 517 (10th Cir. 1954) (“Equity will not
do a useless or vain thing, and in the absence of some likelihood or probability that the
violations will recur, the court is fully justified in refraining from entering an empty decree.”).
121. See Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1650.
122. See infra Part IV.A.4-5.
123. Rendleman, supra note 15, at 357.
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relief.124 Unlike monetary damages, which typically do not require
that a court do anything beyond issuing a final judgment, injunctive
remedies require careful tailoring and often necessitate additional
steps for enforcement.125
In Devine v. Devine, for example, the plaintiff sued her mother-in-
law for making false statements to her husband that she claimed
were intended to wreck her marriage.126 The New Jersey Chancery
Court denied her request for an injunction, noting that an injunction
“would not be enforceable because of the inherent difficulties in-
volved in the enforcement.”127 The court highlighted just how
challenging it would be to effectively enjoin the speech in question:
[I]t appears that the plaintiff would have the court censor the
written or verbal communications by the defendant to her son
and restrain and enjoin the defendant from making adverse
comment or criticisms of the plaintiff to her son, and from telling
any false stories or disseminating any false information to the
son of, about and concerning the plaintiff. Just how the court
could enforce such an order, were an injunction granted, is not
clear and the enforcement of such an injunction would appear to
present insurmountable difficulties.128
124. See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967) (“Loose injunctive orders are
neither easily obeyed nor strictly enforceable.”); Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 819 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“The injunction here, like injunctions against defamation in
general, would also be ineffective, overbroad, or both.”); Jordan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is impossible for the Court to tailor an injunction that
would prevent defamatory remarks while preserving [the employer’s] interest in notifying [the
plaintiff employee’s] clients of his termination.”); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156
P.3d 339, 356 (Cal. 2007) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Subtle differences in
wording can make it exceptionally difficult to determine whether a particular utterance falls
within an injunction's prohibition.”); Devine v. Devine, 90 A.2d 126, 129 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1952) (“[The proposed injunction] would not be enforceable because of the inherent
difficulties involved in the enforcement.”).
125. See Rendleman, supra note 15, at 354 (“Administrative concerns loom larger in equity
than in law. It is difficult to adjudicate, formulate, administer, and enforce injunctions.”);
Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065, 1084
(1979) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978)) (“Sometimes
injunctions are ... difficult to enforce, or difficult for appellate courts to supervise.”).
126. 90 A.2d at 127.
127. Id. at 129.
128. Id.
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Even when a court can reach the speech in question, judges face
significant challenges drafting injunctions that will prevent further
reputational harm without being overbroad or underinclusive. Given
the socially constructed interest that defamation law seeks to
protect,129 an injunction must do more than just restrain the specific
words a defendant has used; it must target the defamatory meaning
ascribed to the defendant’s speech. For example, the accusation that
the plaintiff perjured himself can be communicated in a number of
different ways, including that he “lied under oath,” “was untruth-
ful,” “deceived the court,” “dissembled on the witness stand,” “misled
the jury,” or “prevaricated.” In most cases, an injunction directed
only at the specific words a court has found are defamatory would
be “useless because a defendant can avoid its restrictions by making
the same point using different words without violating the court’s
order.”130 
To prevent the defendant from causing further harm, an injunc-
tion must reach beyond the precise words used and restrain the
defendant from communicating the idea that the plaintiff lied under
oath. But the English language is full of nuance. Words can have
multiple meanings, depending on their context. For example, would
an injunction that forbids the defendant from communicating the
idea that the plaintiff perjured himself prohibit the defendant from
saying that the plaintiff was “disingenuous”? What if the defendant
merely carries placards that say the plaintiff is a “Bad Bad Boy,”
“Don’t Laugh, [He] Screwed You Guys Too!,” or “Your Piss is Not
Rain”? These were among the placards the defendant used when
picketing attorney Johnnie Cochran, Jr., who sued for defamation.131 
Obviously these statements cannot be understood apart from
their context. Defamatory meaning is highly dependent on the
129. See Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World, supra note 12, at 267-69.
130. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 171; see also Ne. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
566-67 (1976) (reversing injunction and noting the “difficulty of drafting an order that will
effectively” prevent the harm from occurring); Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 819 F. Supp. 2d
1087, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Plaintiffs seek to enjoin McWilliams from stating that Plaintiffs
‘sent thugs, Blackwater operatives, or military special forces to intimidate him.’ But this
injunction would be worthless if McWilliams could instead simply claim that Plaintiffs had
hired the mafia or a street gang to threaten him. Such a narrowly tailored injunction would
therefore fail to achieve its purpose of stopping the defendant’s defamatory statements.”).
131. See Cochran v. Tory, No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002)
(order granting permanent injunction), aff’d, No. B159437, 2003 WL 22451378, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 2003), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
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circumstances extant at the time of expression; a statement will not
be actionable if it is understood to be mere hyperbole or if the
context belies the defamatory import the plaintiff ascribes to it.132
This leaves judges with few viable options when enjoining defama-
tory speech. As Erwin Chemerinsky points out, “Any effective
injunction will be overbroad, and any limited injunction will be
ineffective.”133
B. Constitutional Limitations on Injunctive Relief
Because an injunction directed at defamatory speech necessarily
involves a judicial order that is intended to either stop speech before
it is published or preclude its further dissemination, injunctions
raise significant First Amendment concerns. Indeed, in the vast
majority of cases in which courts have considered granting an
injunction directed at defamatory speech, they refuse to do so on the
basis that the injunction would be an unconstitutional prior re-
straint.134
132. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970); MacElree
v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 674 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Pa. 1996). 
133. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 171.
134. See, e.g., Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963); Oakley, Inc., 819
F. Supp. 2d at 1092; Mahmoodian v. Pirnia, No. 3:11-CV-00005, 2012 WL 4458160, at *9
(W.D. Va. June 7, 2012); Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll. of Med. v. Woodward, No. 10-10978, 2010
WL 5185075, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2010); Gunder’s Auto Ctr. v. State Farm Ins., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 442 F. App’x 819 (11th Cir. 2011); Kisser v. Coal.
for Religious Freedom, No. 95-MC-0174, 1995 WL 590169 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1995); Tilton v.
Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 827 F. Supp. 674, 682 (N.D. Okla. 1993); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc.,
288 F. Supp. 989, 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 217 F. 672, 674 (S.D.N.Y.
1914); Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 519 (Ct. App. 1991); Animal Rights
Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Cohen v. Advanced
Med. Grp. of Ga., Inc., 496 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. 1998); Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 541
(Ga. 1992); High Country Fashions, Inc. v. Marlenna Fashions, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga.
1987); Brannon v. Am. Micro Distribs., Inc., 342 S.E.2d 301, 302-03 (Ga. 1986); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Emps., 70 N.E.2d 75, 87 (Ill. 1948); St.
Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 312 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Hill v.
Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Ky. 2010); Guste v. Connick, 5115 So. 2d 436, 438
(La. 1987); Greenberg v. Burglass, 229 So. 2d 83, 87 (La. 1969); State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge
of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 746 (1882); Wolf v. Harris, 184 S.W. 1139, 1141 (Mo.
1916); Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391, 395 (Mo. 1902); Flint v.
Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. 1892); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed’n of
Labor, 96 P. 127, 131 (Mont. 1908); Pebble Brook, Inc. v. Smith, 356 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1976); O’Leary v. Police Dep’t of N. Y., 409 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1978); League
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The prior restraint doctrine is generally understood to bar
government restrictions on speech that are imposed in advance of
publication. Although many kinds of government acts can be prior
restraints, injunctions directed at speech are considered to be an
archetypal form of prior restraint.135 An injunction may restrain
specific aspects of a communication or prohibit all speech entirely.136
The classic example of a speech injunction is Judge Gurfein’s order
enjoining the New York Times Company from publishing news
articles based on the Pentagon Papers.137
The idea that an injunction might run afoul of the First Amend-
ment is a relatively new development in the Supreme Court’s free
speech jurisprudence.138 It was not until 1931, in Near v. Minnesota,
that the Supreme Court first invoked the First Amendment’s free
speech guarantees to invalidate an injunction.139 In Near, local
officials used a “public nuisance” law to charge that The Saturday
Press was printing defamatory stories about them to obtain an
injunction that barred the paper from publishing or distributing
“any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or
defamatory newspaper, as defined by law.”140 According to the
Court, the injunction was unconstitutional because it “would lay a
for Peace with Justice in Palestine v. Newspaper P.M., 65 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983); Ex parte Tucker, 220
S.W. 75, 76 (Tex. 1920); Corpus Christi Caller-Times v. Mancias, 794 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex.
App. 1990); Pirmantgen v. Feminelli, 745 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. App. 1988); Mitchell v. Grand
Lodge, Free & Accepted Masons of Tex., 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
135. See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism
of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 290, 295 (2000); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 426 (1983).
136. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 656.
137. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (issuing
temporary restraining order against “The New York Times, its publisher and other officers
and employees to restrain them from further dissemination or disclosure of certain alleged
top secret or secret documents of the United States”), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
138. Long before the Supreme Court struck down its first speech injunction in Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), several state courts had already held that that an injunction
directed at defamatory speech violated the federal Constitution or their state constitution.
See, e.g., Dailey v. Superior Court of S.F., 44 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1896) (California Constitution);
State ex rel. Liversey, 34 La. Ann. at 746 (U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions); Life Ass’n of Am.
v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 180 (1876) (Missouri Constitution).
139. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
140. Id. at 706. For background on the case, see FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE
DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1981).
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permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must
satisfy the court as to the character of a new publication.”141 Chief
Justice Hughes concluded that “[t]his is the essence of censor-
ship.”142
Although the Court cautioned that the principle it was applying
was “not absolutely unlimited,”143 it did not elucidate any limits.144
Instead, it noted in dicta four “exceptional cases” where an injunc-
tion might be permitted.145 Subsequent decisions by the Court have
clarified to some degree the scope of these exceptions, suggesting
that an injunction may be permissible when the harm is grave and
the threat to First Amendment values is not significant.146
The Court’s prior restraint cases, however, have not provided a
clear definition of what constitutes a prior restraint, nor has the
Court evidenced a consistent theoretical approach to the exceptions
that mark the limits of the doctrine.147 Instead, the Court’s applica-
tion of the prior restraint doctrine has been largely ad hoc, turning
on the specific facts in each case. Not surprisingly, “[t]he lack of a
generally accepted definition, plus the unprincipled gaps created by
the exceptions, has led to a situation in which the prior restraint
141. 283 U.S. at 712. The publisher would be free from punishment if it was able “to satisfy
the judge that the charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable
ends.” Id. at 713.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 716.
144. See Meyerson, supra note 11, at 1087 (noting that the Court in Near “neither defined
prior restraint, nor explained precisely why injunctions fit within a definition of prior
restraint”).
145. 283 U.S. at 715-16. These exceptions are: (1) “actual obstruction [of the Government’s]
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops”; (2) “primary requirements of decency ... against obscene publications”; (3)
“incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government[,] ... words
that may have all the effect of force”; and (4) “[protection of] private rights according to the
principles governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of courts of equity.” Id. at 716. The Court
added that “[t]here is also the conceded authority of courts to punish for contempt when
publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions.” Id. at 715.
146. See THOMAS IRWIN EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
51-53 (1966); LAYCOCK, supra note 44, at 168; Bendor, supra note 135, at 299. The Court also
has held that the prior restraint doctrine does not foreclose injunctions that neutrally regulate
the time, place, and manner of speech. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763-
64 (1994).
147. See, e.g., Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (“[R]elevant case law does not provide
a concise and logically coherent definition of prior restraint on speech.”).
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doctrine is increasingly derided by legal scholars and frequently
misunderstood by the Court itself.”148 Nevertheless, the doctrine
continues to exert a strong pull on judges and is frequently invoked
as a shorthand way of saying that an injunction is presumptively
unconstitutional. 
But what is it about defamation injunctions that strikes courts as
highly suspect? There are two characteristics that raise particular
concerns. First, when the injunction is imposed before speech has
been uttered or published, it denies society access to expression that
has not been subject to public evaluation. Second, if the injunction
is issued before a final determination that the speech is defamatory,
it is likely that speech that cannot be sanctioned will be restrained.
Both of these concerns are discussed in more detail in the following
sections.
1. Prior Restraints and Subsequent Sanctions
The prior restraint doctrine initially arose as a response to
government efforts to restrict speech prior to its public expression.149
Sir William Blackstone summarized the view that such restrictions
were anathema to liberty when he wrote in his Commentaries that
“liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications,
and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished.”150
As Blackstone’s commentary reveals, the law’s antipathy for
restraints instituted prior to publication did not extend to subse-
quent sanctions imposed in response to expressive activity.151 This
148. Meyerson, supra note 11, at 1087-88. 
149. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“[T]he main purpose of [the
First Amendment’s free speech protections] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon
publications as had been practised by other governments.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313-14 (1825)).
150. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151 (1769)
(alteration in original).
151. See id. at 151-52. Of course, other First Amendment doctrines may limit what civil
and criminal sanctions can be imposed on speakers. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (striking down a statute making it a crime for a newspaper to
publish the name of a juvenile without the court’s prior approval); Landmark Commc’ns v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (invalidating criminal sanctions imposed on the newspaper
for publishing confidential information from judicial inquiry).
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conclusion has been the subject of considerable debate, however,
with some scholars saying that distinguishing between prior and
subsequent sanctions is essential for the prior restraint doctrine to
retain any coherence,152 whereas others argue that the distinction
is unnecessary or even illusory.153 “After all, the point of subsequent
punishment is to restrain speech in advance, too.”154
Yet an injunction that forecloses defamatory speech prior to
publication strikes many judges as qualitatively different from
criminal or civil sanctions imposed after speech has been publicly
disseminated. Indeed, in most of the cases in which a court held that
an injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint, the court
concluded that the injunction was impermissible because it would
curtail speech prior to publication.155 The Texas Supreme Court’s
opinion in Ex parte Tucker exemplifies the view that an injunction
restraining defamatory speech prior to publication is incompatible
with fundamental notions of liberty:
152. See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 53 (1984) (arguing that the prior restraint doctrine
“assumes that prior restraints are more harmful to free speech interests than other forms of
regulation”); Scordato, supra note 147, at 30-31 (lamenting the confusion between prior and
subsequent sanctions and proposing that prior restraint doctrine be revised to cover “only
those government actions, that result in the physical interception and suppression of speech
prior to its public expression”).
153. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 135, at 429 (“[I]t seems entirely plausible that the
specifically targeted commands of an injunction are actually likely to be less threatening to
the system of freedom of expression than the inevitably more general proscriptions of a penal
statute.”); Siegel, supra note 1, at 735 (“Modern commentators find the prior restraint/
subsequent punishment distinction overdrawn because both regimes deter and chill speech.”).
154. Steven Helle, Prior Restraint, in COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 62 (W. Wat Hopkins
ed., 2012).
155. See Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089, 1092-93 (C.D. Cal. 2012);
Brannon v. Am. Micro Distribs., Inc., 342 S.E.2d 301, 302-03 (Ga. 1986); Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Emps., 70 N.E.2d 75, 84 (Ill. 1948); St.
Margaret Mercy Healthcare Cntrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996);
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 212 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Greenberg
v. Burglass, 229 So. 2d 83, 89 (La. 1969); State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court,
34 La. Ann. 741, 746 (1882); Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391, 395
(Mo. 1902); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed’n of Labor, 96 P. 127, 131 (Mont. 1908); O’Leary v.
Police Dep’t of N. Y., 409 N.Y.S.2d 676, 679 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Ex parte Tucker, 220 S.W. 75, 76
(Tex. 1920); Corpus Christi Caller-Times v. Mancias, 794 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex. App. 1990);
Pirmantgen v. Feminelli, 745 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex. App. 1988); Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, Free
& Accepted Masons of Tex., 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
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It has never been the theory of free institutions that the citizen
could say only what courts or legislatures might license him to
say, or that his sentiments on any subject or concerning any
person should be supervised before he could utter them. Nothing
could be more odious, more violative or destructive of freedom....
There can be no justification for the utterance of a slander. It
cannot be too strongly condemned. The law makes it a crime.
But there is no power in courts to make one person speak only
well of another. The Constitution leaves him free to speak well
or ill; and if he wrongs another by abusing this privilege, he is
responsible in damages or punishable by the criminal law.156
The idea that the government can punish speech after it occurs
but cannot restrict speech before it is uttered is evident in much of
First Amendment jurisprudence. As Justice Blackmun remarked in
Southeast Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, “Behind the distinction is a
theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the
few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to
throttle them and all others beforehand.”157
Categorizing a speech restriction as either prior restraint or
subsequent sanction, however, can sometimes be difficult.158 This is
especially so in the context of injunctions, in which the apparatus of
enforcement is a contempt proceeding. When judges issue injunc-
tions, they are threatening to sanction a party if it refuses to obey
the court’s directive. In fact, in many of the cases where courts have
enjoined defamatory speech, the court simply ordered the defendant
not to make any future defamatory statements about the plaintiff,
in essence saying: “[O]bey the law or you will face punishment.”159
Given that the threatened sanction–contempt of court–is not
imposed until after the speech has occurred, one might naturally
ask whether the prior restraint doctrine is implicated at all. 
Such a view, however, overlooks the limited procedures available
to challenge injunctive remedies. Under what is called the “collat-
eral bar rule,” when a party faces an injunction, it is compelled to
156. 220 S.W. 75, 76 (Tex. 1920).
157. 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
158. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 11, at 171 n.113 (“This area has been considerably
confused by the Court’s penchant for occasionally condemning speech restrictions as prior
restraints when not even subsequent punishment of the speech would be permissible.”).
159. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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obey the injunction, notwithstanding any constitutional right to
engage in the enjoined conduct, until the injunction is set aside by
the issuing court or by a higher court on appeal.160 In other words,
a defendant can be jailed or fined for violating an injunction, even
if a court later finds that the injunction was improperly issued or
that the First Amendment fully protects the enjoined speech.161 The
injunction in Near v. Minnesota was therefore a greater threat to
the First Amendment than the Minnesota statute the plaintiffs
invoked because once the statute was found to be unconstitutional
its violation could not be punished, whereas violation of the
unconstitutional injunction remained punishable by contempt.162
Failing to distinguish between injunctions issued prior to
publication and subsequent sanctions also overlooks the coercive
effect of injunctions, which in practical terms operate as immediate
restraints on speakers.163 Indeed, the cases themselves reveal that
parties facing a judicial directive to refrain from speaking typically
160. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (“[P]ersons
subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that
decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the
order.”); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967) (justifying the collateral bar
rule on the grounds that “respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing
hand of law”). Because of concern about the chilling effect of the collateral bar rule, some
courts have been unwilling to apply the rule in cases involving speech. For example, in
Walker, the Supreme Court suggested that the rule would not apply if an injunction is
“transparently invalid.” 388 U.S. at 315. A number of lower courts have interpreted this
language to mean that a transparently invalid injunction can, under certain circumstances,
be ignored and then challenged. See, e.g., In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1344,
(1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh’g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987); Phx. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 418 P.2d 594, 592 (Ariz. 1966) (allowing reporter to defeat contempt of court
charge on constitutional grounds); State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 365 (Wash. 1984) (overturning
contempt judgment against broadcaster for airing recording previously played in open court).
161. See Meyerson, supra note 67, at 1140-41; Redish, supra note 152, at 93. Even an
injunction that is ultimately reversed can be a prior restraint: “Enjoined speakers must hold
their tongues while they move to have the injunction vacated or modified.” Vincent Blasi,
Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 32 (1981). Due
to this delay, the speech either “never reaches the marketplace at all” or “may have become
obsolete or unprofitable.” Thomas Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 657 (1955).
162. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975); Chemerinsky, supra
note 11, at 165.
163. In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court looked past the “mere details of procedure”
to conclude that the “operation and effect” of the statute was to restrain speech. 283 U.S. 697,
713 (1931).
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remain silent, even when they believe their speech is fully protected
from subsequent sanction.164
Chief Justice Burger noted the pernicious effect such orders have
in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, in which the Court held that a
state trial judge’s injunction prohibiting the news media from
publishing or broadcasting accounts of a criminal defendant’s
confession was an impermissible prior restraint.165 “A prior restraint
... has an immediate and irreversible sanction,” Chief Justice Burger
warned. “If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions
after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for
the time.”166 
These cases highlight the most salient arguments against
permitting judges to enjoin speech prior to its publication: the desire
to maximize the amount of speech available to society; the inevita-
ble overbreadth that accompanies injunctions; and the absence of
procedural protections that precede the imposition of subsequent
civil and criminal sanctions.
2. Prior Restraints and Full Adjudication
The Supreme Court’s earliest prior restraint decisions left the
impression that only restraints on speech instituted before publica-
tion were presumptively unconstitutional as prior restraints. More
recently, the Court added in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations that “[t]he special vice of a prior
restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly
or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate
determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.”167 In
164. See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22.7 (2013) (noting similar
impact of injunctions in copyright cases, even when defendants have meritorious defenses);
Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 573, 574 (2001) (noting that plaintiffs often seek preliminary injunctions to force
settlements).
165. 427 U.S. 539, 565-67 (1976).
166. Id. at 559.
167. 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). Although the Court stated that certain categories of speech
are “unprotected by the First Amendment,” no speech is entirely invisible to the Constitution.
Id. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (“[S]tatements [that speech is
unprotected by the First Amendment] must be taken in context ... and are no more literally
true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity ‘as not being speech
at all.’”).
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Pittsburgh Press, the Court approved an injunction prohibiting the
publication of classified ads that violated civil rights laws, noting
that the expression being enjoined was clearly illegal, and that this
illegality had been judicially determined before the court issued the
injunction.168 
Following Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected speech restrictions that were imposed based on a mere
“likelihood of success” or other speculative standard.169 According to
the Court, “[O]ur cases firmly hold that mere probable cause to
believe a legal violation has transpired is not adequate to remove
[speech] from circulation.”170 Not surprisingly, most courts that have
addressed the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order directed at defamatory speech have
concluded that such relief would be unconstitutional.171
Even if an injunction follows a finding of defamation, however, it
remains an open question whether the First Amendment would
permit a court to enjoin further publication. The Supreme Court has
never held that an injunction directed at defamatory speech is
constitutional. The Court recently had the chance to do so in Tory
v. Cochran,172 but when the plaintiff died a week after oral argu-
ment, the Court decided the case on narrow grounds.173 
In Tory, a client of widely renowned attorney Johnnie Cochran,
Jr.’s law firm felt that the firm had treated him badly and that
168. 413 U.S. 376, 390-91. The Court also noted that the injunction did not prohibit
political expression. Id.
169. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“[I]njunctive
relief [i]s an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971)
(“[T]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result.”) (Brennan,
J., concurring). But see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (suggesting that
preliminary injunctions against alleged obscenity may be permissible, so long as the
injunction creates only a relatively slight delay before full adjudication).
170. Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 66 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 217 F. 672, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Evans v. Evans,
76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 868 (App. 2008); Cohen v. Advanced Med. Grp. of Ga., Inc., 496 S.E.2d
710, 710 (Ga. 1998); Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. 1992); High Country Fashions,
Inc. v. Marlenna Fashions, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 576, 576 (Ga. 1987); Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp.,
325 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Ky. 2010); Wolf v. Harris, 184 S.W. 1139, 1141 (Mo. 1916); Flint v.
Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo. 1892).
172. 544 U.S. 734, 735-36 (2005).
173. Id. at 737-38.
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Cochran owed him money.174 Ulysses Tory complained to the local
bar association, wrote threatening letters to Cochran demanding ten
million dollars, picketed Cochran’s office holding up signs containing
insults and obscenities, and, along with others, pursued Cochran
while chanting similar threats and insults.175 Cochran sued and
requested a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
and permanent injunction to stop the defamatory speech.176 Cochran
did not seek money damages.177 
The California trial court granted Cochran’s request for a
preliminary injunction and after a bench trial, concluded that Tory
was engaging in a continuous pattern of libelous and slanderous
activity in order to coerce Cochran to pay money that Tory was not
owed, and that Tory would continue to engage in this activity in the
absence of a court order.178 It then issued a permanent injunction
enjoining Tory and his wife Ruth Craft, who was not a defendant in
the case, from making any statements about Johnnie Cochran or the
law offices of Johnnie Cochran in any public forum.179 In other
words, the injunction was not limited to defamatory speech; it
prohibited Tory and Craft from saying anything about Cochran or
his law firm. The California Court of Appeals upheld the injunc-
tion.180
The United States Supreme Court granted Tory and Craft’s
petition for certiorari and noted that the question before the Court
was: “Whether a permanent injunction as a remedy in a defamation
action, preventing all future speech about an admitted public figure,
violates the First Amendment.”181 Seven days after the case was
174. Id.
175. Id. at 735.
176. Id.
177. Erwin Chemerinsky, who represented Ulysses Tory and his wife Ruth Craft in the
Supreme Court, noted that “Tory was judgment-proof, there were no assets to be had.” Erwin
Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, Law, and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449,
1459 (2009).
178. Tory, 544 U.S. at 735-36.
179. Id. Dean Chemerinsky gives us a little more flavor on the result: “Ulysses Tory, who
has a tenth grade education, represented himself. You can guess who prevailed at trial. The
trial judge said to Johnnie Cochran’s lawyer, ‘Draft an injunction,’ and the lawyer did what
any zealous attorney would do: He wrote a really broad injunction.” Chemerinsky, supra note
177, at 1459 (citation omitted).
180. Tory, 544 U.S. at 736, vacating 2003 WL 22451378 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003).
181. Tory, 544 U.S. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2013] SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND INJUNCTIONS 41
argued before the Court, Johnnie Cochran died.182 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stephen Breyer explained that the case was not
moot because the injunction remained in effect.183 Nevertheless,
Breyer concluded that because of Cochran’s death, there was no
need to consider whether injunctions are permissible in defamation
cases, noting that “Johnnie Cochran’s death makes it unnecessary,
indeed unwarranted, for us to explore petitioners’ basic claims....
Rather, we need only point out that the injunction, as written, has
now lost its underlying rationale.”184 Offering little in the way of
additional guidance, Breyer explained:
Since picketing Cochran and his law offices while engaging in
injunction-forbidden speech could no longer achieve the objec-
tives that the trial court had in mind (i.e., coercing Cochran to
pay a “tribute” for desisting in this activity), the grounds for the
injunction are much diminished, if they have not disappeared
altogether. Consequently the injunction, as written, now
amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking
plausible justification.185
The Court left unanswered whether a more narrowly tailored
injunction would be constitutional. If, for example, the injunction
only prohibited Ulysses Tory from repeating the specific statements
the court had found at trial were defamatory, would such an order
have passed constitutional muster? Perhaps it would. While
cautioning that “[w]e express no view on the constitutional validity
of any such new relief,”186 the Tory Court left the door open by
stating that an injunction “may still be warranted,” if it were “tail-
ored to these changed circumstances.”187 As discussed below, any
such relief would undoubtedly have to be preceded by a judicial deter-
mination that the enjoined speech is properly subject to restraint.188 
182. Id.
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 737-38.
185. Id. at 738.
186. Id. at 738-39.
187. Id. 
188. See infra Part IV.A.1. Dean Chemerinsky appears to have adopted this position as
well. Initially, in his brief to the Court in Tory and in a contemporaneous law review article
he argued that even injunctions that follow a trial are impermissible prior restraints. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 163. Several years later, he wrote that an injunction “limited
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III. A NEW APPROACH EMERGES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
As Part II reveals, as late as the second half of the twentieth
century, American courts considered it settled that libelous speech
could not be enjoined, even after a finding of defamation. In the
later part of the twentieth century, this started to change, as an
increasing number of courts began granting and upholding injunc-
tions in defamation cases. This section traces that change and
examines the justifications judges proffered when departing from
the no-injunction rule.
A survey of more than 242 decisions involving injunctions
directed at defamatory speech reveals that at least fifty-six decisions
have granted or affirmed injunctions, with an especially sharp
increase in such decisions after 2000.189 While these cases covered
a broad range of expression, including oral statements,190 books,191
to specific speech that is proven to be false” would be the best solution, noting, “the position
that I took as an advocate is different from that which I would argue as a scholar I think the
Court should take.” Chemerinsky, supra note 177, at 1458, 1460.
189. Of the fifty-six decisions the author could find granting or affirming injunctive relief,
thirty-one were issued after January 1, 2000. Only six decisions prior to 1950 granted or
affirmed an injunction directed at libelous or slanderous speech. See Chamber of Commerce
of Minneapolis v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 13 F.2d 673, 696-97 (8th Cir. 1926); Am. Malting Co.
v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 361 (2d Cir. 1913); Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 52 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888);
Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 11 So. 2d 383, 386 (Ala. 1943); Menard v. Houle, 11 N.E.2d 436,
437 (Mass. 1937); Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 239 (Tex. App. 1924).
190. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 858 (Cal. 1999); Barlow v.
Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Hawks, 265 S.W. at 236.
191. See Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Minn.
1984).
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letters,192 trade publications,193 signs,194 and even cars,195 nearly half
involved speech on the Internet.196 
Although some courts neglected to address the relevant constitu-
tional and equitable principles involved before granting an injunc-
tion,197 those courts that did analyze the propriety of injunctive
relief invariably noted the no-injunction rule, but nevertheless
relied on at least one of three justifications for departing from the
rule: (1) the speech impugned the plaintiff’s property interest; (2)
the defendant engaged in a continuing course of conduct that caused
192. See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1203 (6th Cir. 1990); Am. Malting Co.,
209 F. at 352.
193. See Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis, 13 F.2d at 682; Emack, 34 F. at 47.
194. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230,
1233 (9th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 979 (D. Or. 1963);
Wallace v. Cass, No. 04CC05117, 2008 WL 626475, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2008);
Cochran v. Tory, No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002)
(order granting permanent injunction), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005); Guion v. Terra Mktg.,
523 P.2d 847, 848 (Nev. 1974); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157 (App. Div. 1992);
Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), rev’d, 482 Pa. 377 (1978).
195. See Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 11 So. 2d 383, 383 (Ala. 1943) (enjoining defendant
from driving a car with a white elephant and the word “Hudson” painted on it); Hajek v. Bill
Mowbray Motors, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 827, 829-30, 834 (Tex. App. 1982) (enjoining use of the
word “lemon” on defendant’s car), rev’d, 647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983).
196. Twenty-seven of the fifty-six decisions granting injunctive relief involved speech on
the Internet. See N. Am. Recycling, LLC v. Texamet Recycling, LLC, No. 3283380, 2012 WL
3283380, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2012); Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll. of Med. v. Woodward, 837
F. Supp. 2d 676, 689 (E.D. Mich. 2011); Bluemile, Inc. v. Yourcolo, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-497,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62178, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2011); Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-
CV-386-SEB-JMS, 2009 WL 1035265, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2009); Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc.
v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 680-81 (N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Davis, 334 B.R. 874, 889 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 2005), rev’d in part, 347 B.R. 607, 610 (W.D. Ky. 2006); Stutz Artiano Shinoff &
Holtz v. Larkins, No. 37-2007-007218, 2011 WL 3425629, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 30, 2009),
rev’d, 2011 WL 3425629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Aug 5, 2011); Evans v. Evans, No. GIC881162,
2007 WL 5490538, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 25, 2007), rev’d, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859 (Ct. App.
2008); Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Griffis v. Luban,
No. CV-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002); Apex Tech. Grp., Inc.
v. Does, No. MID-L-7878-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 23, 2009); Glassman v. Feldman,
No. 102988/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (Bloomberg Law); Rombom v. Weberman, No.
1378100, 2002 WL 1461890, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002), aff’d, 766 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App.
Div. 2003); Cullum v. White, No. 04-09-0095, 2010 WL 3333056, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 25,
2010); Bat World Sanctuary v. Cummins, No. 352-248169-10, 2012 WL 4050469 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 27, 2012); Burfoot v. May4thCounts.com, No. CL10-2735 (Va. Cir. Apr. 21, 2010),
withdrawn, 80 Va. Cir. 306 (Apr. 22, 2010).
197. See generally Bluemile, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62178; Apex Tech. Grp., Inc., No.
MID-L-7878-09; Bat World Sanctuary, 2012 WL 4050469; Dietz Dev., LLC v. Perez, No. 2012-
16249 (Va. Cir. Ct., Dec. 5, 2012).
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the plaintiff harm; or (3) the speech had been adjudged to be
defamatory. 
A. Exceptions to the No-Injunction Rule
1. Speech That Impugns Property Interests
One of the earliest exceptions to the no-injunction rule was based
on the belief that a court could issue an injunction if the order was
directed at preserving business or other property interests.198 We see
this solicitude for property rights in cases in which the defendant is
alleged to have defamed the plaintiff by questioning the legitimacy
of his patents199 or the quality of his products or services,200 and in
claims for tortious interference with contracts or business relation-
ships.201 In essence, these courts held that an injunction was proper
because the plaintiff had an interest in something other than per-
sonal reputation. 
The indulgent treatment accorded to plaintiffs when property
interests are at stake is evident in other doctrinal areas as well,
especially in copyright cases, in which courts are “unquestionably
more favorable to plaintiffs than to defendants.”202 According to
198. See Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 27 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (“The utmost extent to
which the court of chancery has ever gone in restraining any publication by injunction, has
been upon the principle of protecting the rights of property.”). There is some disagreement
over whether, in addition to an interest in property, the plaintiff must also allege acts of
conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion. See Carter, 11 So. 2d at 385 (discussing disagreement
on this point). 
199. See, e.g., A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900);
Warren Featherbone Co. v. Landauer, 151 F. 130, 134 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1903); Emack v. Kane,
34 F. 46, 52 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888).
200. See, e.g., Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Advanced Training
Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Guion v. Terra Mktg. of Nev.,
Inc., 523 P.2d 847, 847-48 (Nev. 1974); Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1976), rev’d, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978); Hajek, 645 S.W.2d at 834, rev’d, 647 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. 1983). 
201. See, e.g., Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1913); Wolf v. Gold, 193
N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (App. Div. 1959); W. Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Guion, 523 P.2d at 848; Amalgamated Acme Affiliates v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d
387, 394-96 (Tex. App. 2000).
202. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 11, at 165. As early as the eighteenth century, English
courts of chancery had jurisdiction to restrain publications “that infringed copyright, whether
based on statute, common law, or the Crown’s or Parliament’s prerogative monopolies over
publishing certain subjects.” Siegel, supra note 1, at 678.
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Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh, who wrote the defin-
itive treatment of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases,
injunctions—even preliminary injunctions—are granted as “a
matter of course” to prevent copyright infringement.203 Indeed, in
intellectual property cases, courts view protection of the plaintiff’s
property interests as clearly superior to any countervailing speech
interests. As Professor Wendy Gordon noted, “The incantation
‘property’ seems sufficient to render free speech issues invisible” in
such cases.204
Given that “property interests” enjoy no special dispensation
under the First Amendment,205 this justification for granting an
injunction directed at defamatory speech makes little sense.
Moreover, it seems perverse to say that a plaintiff who is being
ostracized by her neighbors due to defamatory speech is not entitled
to equitable relief, whereas the owner of the local car repair shop
can get an injunction because his business is suffering. This is
precisely the reasoning an Indiana court relied on in Barlow v.
Sipes:
A business flourishes or folds on its reputation in a community,
and it appears that Sipes Body has cultivated a very good
reputation in the Lawrence County area. However, the record
indicates that the Barlows’ statements have somewhat eroded
this good name, and equitable relief is the most efficient and
practical means of ensuring that the good will of Sipes Body is
not destroyed pending the resolution of the tort suits.... There-
fore, the grant of equitable relief was proper not only to provide
203. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 11, at 150. This may be changing due to the Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). See DiSarro, supra
note 74, at 84 (observing that some courts have interpreted eBay as barring presumptions of
irreparable harm in copyright cases).
204. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1537 (1993).
205. See id. at 1537 (“Lawyers, law professors, and even judges are on record pleading for
the law to subject intellectual property to the same free speech principles that limit other
assertions of governmental power.”); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 11, at 182 (“The argument
that copyright law should be exempted from standard First Amendment procedural rules
because it protects property rights strikes us as a non sequitur.”); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces
and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 737-38 (1992) (criticizing the use of a
property analysis to grant injunctive relief in light of free speech law’s disapproval of prior
restraints).
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a complete remedy for Sipes Body's economic injury, but also for
its reputational harm.206
 
Where the speech relates to products or services, some courts also
have held that the lesser constitutional protection afforded to
“commercial speech” permitted them to issue injunctive relief.207 The
argument here is that commercial speech “is more objective, and
hence more verifiable, than other types of speech.”208 Furthermore,
“because of its importance to business profits, and because it is
carefully calculated, [it] is also less likely than other forms of
speech to be inhibited by proper regulation.”209
2. Speech That Is Part of a Continuing Course of Conduct 
Recall that in Cochran v. Tory, the California Court of Appeals
stated that an injunction was warranted because Ulysses Tory
conceded that he would continue to picket Johnnie Cochran’s office,
even if he were held liable for defamation.210 Other courts have also
found it relevant that the speech at issue was part of a continuing
course of tortious conduct or that the defendant had given clear
indications he would continue to defame or harass the plaintiff.211
206. 744 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
207. See Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn.
1984); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2000). It
is highly questionable whether these cases actually involved commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1081 (2000)
(“[S]peech can’t be commercial just because it relates to commerce, or else the Wall Street
Journal, union leaflets and newsletters, newspaper reviews of commercial products, and
speech by disgruntled consumers criticizing what they consider poor service by producers
would be deprived of full constitutional protection.”) (footnotes omitted).
208. Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, 33 S.W.3d at 394 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S.
1, 10 (1979)).
209. Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10); see
also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976) (noting in dicta that commercial speech “may also make inapplicable the prohibition
against prior restraints”).
210. No. B159437, 2003 WL 22451378, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) (“Based upon his
prior unlawful conduct and his admissions in court that, absent restraint by the court, he
would continue to picket Cochran, Tory has no basis for his challenge to the breadth of the
injunction.”), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
211. See, e.g., San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d
1230, 1238 (9th Cir. 1997); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1990)
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Unlike in Tory, however, most of these courts held that the continu-
ing conduct was a sufficient justification for granting an injunction
even though there had not been a final determination that the
speech was defamatory.212
The gravamen of these cases is that the publication is part of a
conspiracy to coerce or intimidate the plaintiff. In many of the
decisions, however, it is difficult to identify any added harm the
plaintiff will suffer due to the speaker’s tortious conduct that would
not also be attributable to the defamatory speech. Moreover, the
quantum of additional conduct that can bring a case within this
exception is often quite minimal. For example, in Eppley v. Iacovelli,
the court relied on the defendant’s very act of publishing websites
and videos accusing the plaintiff doctor of causing her ailments in
concluding that injunctive relief was proper because the defendant
had “engaged in an intentional ‘smear campaign’ through defama-
tory Internet publications.”213 Similarly, in West Willow Realty
Corp. v. Taylor, the court held that the defendant’s picketing of
plaintiffs’ business with signs and pamphlets complaining that it
had sold him a home with defects was sufficient to justify an
injunction because the defendant’s actions were “designed and put
into effect for the purpose of intimidating plaintiffs and coercing a
(Wellford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 13 F.2d 673, 686 (8th Cir. 1926); Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 52
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888); N. Am. Recycling, LLC v. Texamet Recycling, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-579, 2012
WL 3283380, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2012); Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-CV-386-SEB-JMS,
2009 WL 1035265, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2009); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp.
978, 984 (D. Or. 1963), aff’d, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964); Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 11 So.
2d 383, 384-85 (Ala. 1943); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 350 (Cal.
2007); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 852-53 (Cal. 1999); Wallace v. Cass,
No. 6036490, 2008 WL 626475, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. March 10, 2008); Bingham v. Struve, 591
N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App. Div. 1992); Rombom v. Weberman, No. 1378100, 2002 WL 1461890,
at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002), aff’d, 766 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App. Div. 2003); W. Willow Realty
Corp. v. Taylor, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Guion v. Terra Mktg. of Nev., Inc., 523
P.2d 847, 847-48 (Nev. 1974); Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 827, 829-31
(Tex. App. 1982), rev’d, 647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983); Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 239 (Tex.
App. 1924).
212. See, e.g., Eppley, 2009 WL 1035265; Martin, 224 F. Supp. at 984; W. Willow Realty
Corp., 198 N.Y.S.2d at 198; Guion, 523 P.2d at 848; Hajek, 645 S.W.2d at 834; Hawks, 265
S.W. at 239.
213. Eppley, 2009 WL 1035265, at *4.
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settlement of the claims of and the action brought by defendant
against [plaintiffs’ business].”214
3. Speech That Has Been Adjudged to Be Defamatory
The reason courts most often cite when departing from the no-
injunction rule is that the injunction will restrain speech that has
been held to be defamatory. In 1975, Ohio and Georgia became the
first states to adopt this exception, holding that “[o]nce speech has
judicially been found libelous, if all the requirements for injunctive
relief are met, an injunction for restraint of continued publication
of that same speech may be proper.”215 Nearly a decade later, the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted this approach in Advanced
Training Systems v. Caswell Equipment Co., affirming a permanent
injunction restraining the defendant from publishing marketing
materials that the jury found contained libelous statements about
the plaintiff’s products.216 The court reasoned:
Under the recent decisions of this court and the United States
Supreme Court, the permanent injunction below is not unconsti-
tutional.... Other courts have also upheld the suppression of
libel, so long as the suppression is limited to the precise state-
ments found libelous after a full and fair adversary proceeding.
We therefore hold that the injunction below, limited as it is to
material found either libelous or disparaging after a full jury
trial, is not unconstitutional and may stand.217
The California Supreme Court found this reasoning persuasive in
Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen,218 one of the most influential
decisions rejecting the no-injunction rule. The case, not unlike many
214. 198 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
215. O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975); see also
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975) (affirming injunction because the
“jury verdict necessarily found the statements of [defendant] to have been false and
defamatory, and the evidence authorized a conclusion that the libel had been repetitive”);
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (permitting
an injunction “so long as the suppression is limited to the precise statements found libelous
after a full and fair adversary proceeding”).
216. 352 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Minn. 1984).
217. Id. at 11 (citing Retail Credit Co., 218 S.E.2d at 62; O’Brien, 327 N.E.2d at 755).
218. 156 P.3d 339, 348 (Cal. 2007).
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defamation cases, involved a disturbing pattern of behavior. Anne
Lemen owned a home across an alley from the Balboa Island Village
Inn and was a vocal critic of the establishment, having contacted the
authorities numerous times to complain of excessive noise and the
behavior of inebriated customers leaving the bar.219 In an effort to
document these problems, Lemen photographed and videotaped
customers entering and leaving the building, sometimes calling
them “drunks” and “whores.”220 She told customers entering the Inn
that “the food is shitty” and told neighbors that “there was child
pornography and prostitution going on in the Inn, and that the
Village Inn was selling drugs and [ ] alcohol to minors.”221 In its
lawsuit, the Village Inn alleged causes of action for nuisance,
defamation, and intentional interference with business relations
and sought injunctive relief against the defendant.222 Following a
bench trial, the court issued a permanent injunction that prohib-
ited, inter alia, the defendant from making defamatory statements
about the plaintiff to third persons.223 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision, but substantially limited the injunction.224
Acknowledging that an injunction directed at defamatory speech
raised significant constitutional concerns, the California Supreme
Court distinguished the present case from earlier decisions invali-
dating injunctive relief: “Prohibiting a person from making a
statement or publishing a writing before that statement is spoken
or the writing is published is far different from prohibiting a
defendant from repeating a statement or republishing a writing
that has been determined at trial to be defamatory and, thus,
unlawful.”225
After reviewing the equitable and constitutional principles that
led to the no-injunction rule, the California Supreme Court held
219. Id. at 341.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 341, 342.
222. Id. at 342.
223. Id.
224. The court of appeals affirmed the provision in the injunction that precluded the
defendant from filming within twenty-five feet of the Village Inn, but invalidated the
provisions that limited the defendant’s contact with the plaintiff’s employees and prohibited
her from making defamatory statements about the plaintiff, holding that they violated the
defendant’s right to free speech under the California and Federal Constitutions. Id.
225. Id. at 344-45.
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that an injunction that is narrowly tailored, directed at stopping a
continuing course of repetitive speech, and granted after a final
determination that speech is unprotected does not constitute an
unlawful prior restraint.226 The court ultimately affirmed the injun-
ction, but remanded the case with instructions that any injunction
be “limited to prohibiting Lemen personally from repeating her
defamatory statements.”227 
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently announced that it too was
joining Ohio, Georgia, Minnesota, and California and adopting the
“modern rule” that defamatory speech may be enjoined after a final
determination that “the speech at issue is, in fact, false.”228 Several
decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court also appear to suggest in
dicta that an injunction is permissible if it follows a jury’s verdict
that the speech is defamatory.229 To date, no state supreme court
has expressly rejected this approach as violative of the federal
Constitution, although several courts have held that the free speech
guarantees in their state constitutions pose an independent bar to
injunctive relief in defamation cases.230
226. Id. at 349.
227. Id. at 352. 
228. Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010) (vacating an injunction
on grounds of overbreadth, but stating that narrowly tailored injunctions would be
permissible). The Kentucky decision, however, deviates from the approach taken by Ohio,
Georgia, Minnesota, and California in that it appears to require that the plaintiff prove only
that the speech in question is false, rather than requiring proof of all of the elements of
defamation. See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing adoption
of the rule in Ohio, Georgia, and Minnesota); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 350. As
discussed infra Part IV.A.1, a plaintiff must establish all of the elements of a defamation
claim before a court can issue any sanction directed at the allegedly defamatory speech, let
alone an injunction. 
229. See Ryan v. Warrensburg, 117 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1938); Wolf v. Harris, 184 S.W.
1139, 1141-42 (Mo. 1916); Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804, 806 (Mo.
1892).
230. See, e.g., Dailey v. Super. Ct., 44 P. 458, 460 (Cal. 1896) (California Constitution);
State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil Dist. Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 746 (1882) (Louisiana
Constitution); Life Ass’n of Am. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 179-80 (1876) (Missouri
Constitution); Lindsay & Co. v. Mont. Fed’n of Labor, 96 P. 127, 131 (Mont. 1908) (Montana
Constitution); Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 158 N.W. 358, 359 (Neb. 1916) (Nebraska Constitution);
Willing v. Mozzacone, 339 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania Constitution); Mitchell
v. Grand Lodge, Free & Accepted Masons of Tex., 121 S.W. 178, 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909)
(Texas Constitution). My focus here, however, is on the limitations imposed by the U.S.
Constitution. 
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Of the five federal circuit courts of appeal to have addressed this
issue, three have held that injunctions are permissible if there has
been a finding of defamation.231 Only the Second Circuit has
expressly rejected this justification for granting injunctive relief,
remarking that “[w]e have never held in this Circuit that a libel
becomes subject to an injunction once its libelous character has been
adjudicated.”232 Although the Seventh Circuit recently invalidated
an injunction on the basis of overbreadth, it echoed the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tory v. Cochran, stating: “[W]e vacate the
injunction as written and express no opinion on the constitutional
validity of any new, narrowed injunctive relief the district court
might think appropriate after considering all of the relevant
factors.”233 
In summary, although the overall number of decisions granting
injunctions is small relative to the total number of cases in which
plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, it is clear that a trend is
emerging within both state and federal courts that permits injunc-
tions if the speech in question was adjudged to be defamatory.
231. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230,
1238 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the injunction and stating “the district court correctly found
that the Union's display of the banner was fraudulent[;] ... the First Amendment does not
protect fraud”); Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992) (remanding and
ordering the district court to “narrow its previous language so as to enjoin the dissemination
of information relating to the tests and samples that were the subject of the underlying suit”);
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (permitting an injunction, but limiting the
“application of such injunction to the statements which have been found in this and prior
proceedings to be false and libelous”). The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Antonio Community
Hospital, however, diverges from the other decisions because it affirmed a preliminary
injunction where no jury or court had made a final determination that the speech was
defamatory. See 125 F.3d at 1240 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“An
interlocutory injunction based on a ‘reasonable probability’ of malice, is, by hypothesis, not
based on ‘actual malice.’”).
232. Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172,
178 (2d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit also refused to recognize an exception for post-
adjudication injunctions in Kramer v. Thompson, noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court had rejected the “modern” view as violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Willing
v. Mozzacone, 339 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978), and that “Pennsylvania would appear firmly bound
to the traditional rule.” 947 F.2d 668, 678 (3d Cir. 1991).
233. e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 603, 606 (7th Cir. 2007) (vacating
injunction that prohibited the defendant from “alleg[ing] or assert[ing] that [p]laintiffs are
spammers or other like term”).
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B. Problems of Overbreadth and Underinclusiveness
Before we declare the no-injunction rule dead—and it is far too
early to do so—it should be noted that not all injunctions are created
equal. Even in cases in which an injunction follows a finding that
the speech is defamatory, the injunction may still be an imper-
missibly broad restraint on speech. It is no easy task to craft a
narrowly tailored injunction that will achieve a plaintiff’s purposes
without being overbroad or underinclusive. 
A review of the cases reveals that courts have indeed struggled
with how to fashion an injunction that is both broad enough to
prevent further reputational harm to the plaintiff and sufficiently
narrow to allow the defendant to engage in the lawful exercise of his
speech rights. To aid in the analysis of the injunctions courts have
issued, the injunctions can be placed into four general category
types, I-IV, roughly in order from broadest to narrowest in scope.
1. Type I Injunctions
A number of courts have issued what we will call a “Type I”
injunction, which prohibits a party from making any statements
about the plaintiff.234 In fact, this was precisely the type of injunc-
tion at issue in Cochran v. Tory, where the trial judge permanently
enjoined the defendant and his non-party wife from “orally uttering
statements about Cochran and/or Cochran’s law firm.”235 Apart from
ordering someone not to speak at all—an obviously impermissible
injunction that does not appear in the cases—Type I injunctions are
the broadest and most problematic of the four types of injunctions
courts have issued. Because Type I injunctions invariably restrain
234. Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:04-CV-386-SEB-JMS, 2009 WL 1035265 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17,
2009) (ordering defendant to remove “[a]ll posting on the internet, made by the defendant ...
subsequent to this action ... which refer to” the plaintiff or his attorneys); Stutz Artiano
Shinoff & Holtz v. Larkins, No. 34-2007-0076218 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009), rev’d, No.
D057190, 2011 WL 3425629 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2011); Cochran v. Tory, No. BC239405,
2002 WL 33966354, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002) (ordering that defendant is
“permanently enjoined from ... orally uttering statements about Cochran and/or Cochran’s law
firm”), vacated, 544 U.S. 734 (2005); Apex Tech. Grp., Inc. v. Doe, No. MID-L-7879-09 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 23, 2009) (issuing a preliminary injunction ordering, inter alia,
removal from websites of any postings referring to plaintiffs).
235. Cochran, 2002 WL 33966354, at *1.
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speech not adjudged to be defamatory—speech that even under the
most generous application of libel law, could never be found
defamatory—they are plainly overbroad and therefore unconstitu-
tional.236 Not surprisingly, in many of the cases in which a court
granted such an injunction, it was reversed or vacated on appeal, or
subsequently dissolved by the trial court.237 
2. Type II Injunctions
No less problematic are “Type II” injunctions, which prohibit a
party from publishing any defamatory statements about the
plaintiff.238 Type II injunctions are overbroad because they are not
precise enough to put the defendant on notice as to what speech will
violate the injunction.239 In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court
236. See supra Part II.B.2.
237. See Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738-39 (2005); Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d
483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963); Stutz Artiano Shinoff & Holtz, 2011 WL 3425629, at *7-10; Wallace
v. Cass, No. G036490, 2008 WL 626475, at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Sid Dillon Chevrolet-
Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 744, 747 (Neb. 1997); Cullum v. White,
No. 04-09-00695-CV, 2011 WL 6202800, at *13 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2011).
238. See Chamber of Commerce v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 13 F.2d 673, 682, 696-97 (8th Cir.
1926) (discussing the order issued by the district court and upholding the injunction); Ordonez
v. Icon Sky Holdings LLC, No. 10-60156-CIV, 2011 WL 3843890, at *7-9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30,
2011); Bluemile, Inc. v. Yourcolo, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-497, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62178, at *2
(S.D. Ohio June 10, 2011); Evans v. Evans, No. GIC881152, 2007 WL 5490 538 (Cal. Super.
Ct. May 25, 2007), rev’d, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859 (App. 4th 2008); Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1,
5, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); W. Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196, 200 (Sup. Ct.
1960), appeal dismissed, 205 N.Y.S.2d 810 (App. Div.) 1960). 
239. See 13 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.60[2] (3d. ed. 2013)
(“A restraining order or injunction must state its terms specifically. An injunction is
impermissibly overbroad if it seeks to restrain the defendant from engaging in legal conduct
or from engaging in illegal conduct that is not fairly the subject of the litigation.”). As a result,
in many of the cases in which a court granted such an injunction, it was reversed on appeal
or subsequently disolved by the trial court. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
706, 722-23 (1931) (overturning a state statute permitting broad injunctions and the specific
injunction at issue); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 536 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1976);
Oorah, Inc. v. Schick, No. 09-CV-00353, 2012 WL 3233674, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012)
(denying request for injunction because plaintiff failed to show that remedies available at law
were inadequate); Wilson v. Super. Ct., 532 P.2d 116, 122-23 (Cal. 1975) (“[P]etitioner was
placed in the untenable position of speculating on whether his attempts to comply with the
court orders were satisfactory.”); Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-69 (“This sweeping
prohibition fails to adequately delineate which of Linda’s future comments might violate the
injunction.”); Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 524 (Ct. App. 1991); Hill
v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 311 & n.5 (Ky. 2010); Rosenberg Diamond Dev. Corp.
v. Appel, 735 N.Y.S.2d 528, 528 (App. Div. 2002); Brammer v. KB Home Lone Star, L.P., 114
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struck down just such an injunction that barred the defendant from
publishing or distributing “any publication whatsoever which is a
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper.”240 In practical
terms, Type II injunctions place the judge in the perpetual role of
censor, deciding on a contempt-by-contempt basis what speech is
permissible.241 As Chief Justice Hughes warned in Near, this type
of injunction is “the essence of censorship.”242 
3. Type III Injunctions
“Type III” injunctions prohibit a party from publishing certain
enumerated statements about the plaintiff without limiting the
injunction to the specific statements that have been found to be
defamatory.243 A Type III injunction, for example, might order the
S.W.3d 101, 114 (Tex. App. 2003) (rejecting portions of a temporary injunction prohibiting the
defendant from defaming the plaintiff).
240. Near, 283 U.S. at 706. 
241. See, e.g., Wilson, 532 P.2d at 122-23 (reversing injunction and noting that the trial
court “aggressively assumed the role of governmental censor, approving its version of a ‘fair’
presentation, and disapproving a ‘too narrow view of the truth’”).
242. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
243. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230,
1238 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming a preliminary injunction prohibiting display of a banner
stating, “This medical facility is full of rats”); Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 50-51 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1888) (enjoining defendant from making statements aimed at scaring plaintiff’s customers
away and ruining his reputation); N. Am. Recycling, LLC v. Texamet Recycling, LLC, No.
2:08-CV-579, 2012 WL 3283380, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (enjoining future statements that are
“significantly similar” to those that had been found to be defamatory); Frontier Mgmt. Co. v.
Balboa Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (D. Mass. 1985) (issuing a preliminary injunction
directed at specific false statements that “the program was unprofitable”); Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D. Or. 1963) (ordering removal of signs pending completion
of case), aff’d, 337 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Davis, 334 B.R. 874, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2005) (ordering removal of website and enjoining defendant from creating another similar
website), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D. Ky. 2006); Carter v. Knapp Motor
Co., 11 S. 2d 383, 386 (Ala. 1943) (affirming a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant
from driving a car painted with a white elephant); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980
P.2d 846, 863 (Cal. 1999) (prohibiting “derogatory racial or ethnic epithets directed at, or
descriptive of, Hispanic/Latino employees”); Giordano v. Romeo, No. 09-68539-CA25 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 28, 2010) (directing operator of website to cease “maintaining the statements about
Plaintiffs posted by Romeo”), withdrawn, No. 09-68539-LA25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2011);
Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (upholding
the injunction issued by lower court because it was limited to material previously adjudicated
to be libel); Glassman v. Feldman, No. 102988/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (granting a
temporary restraining order ordering removal of specified allegedly defamatory statements
from the Internet); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 393, 398-99
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defendant to take down an entire website, even though only a few
statements on the site have been found to be defamatory, or it might
prohibit speech when there has been no finding of defamation at all.
This type of injunction is common when the defendant has not put
on a vigorous defense. This includes cases in which the defendant
did not appear, and the court either converted the complaint into an
injunction or relied on the plaintiff to draft the language in the
order.244 Although a Type III injunction can be narrower than a
Type II injunction because it gives the defendant specific guidance
as to what is prohibited, Type III injunctions are, nevertheless,
overbroad because they enjoin speech that has not been adjudged
defamatory. Indeed, in several of the cases in which a judge issued
such an injunction it was ultimately withdrawn or overturned on
appeal.245
(Tex. App. 2000) (affirming the lower court’s injunction prohibiting enumerated
communications); Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 827, 834 (Tex. App. 1982)
(affirming the lower court’s issuance of an injunction prohibiting defendant from publishing
and circulating statements that the van sold by plaintiff was a lemon), rev’d, 647 S.W.2d 253
(Tex. 1983); Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 236, 239 (Tex. App. 1924) (reversing the lower
court’s denial of an injunction prohibiting the defendant from speaking to the plaintiff or to
any of plaintiff’s employers about her relations or association with the defendant); Bat World
Sanctuary v. Cummins, No. 352-248169-10, 2012 WL 4050469 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 27, 2012)
(prohibiting the defendant from posting anywhere on the Internet or publishing in any way
any of the statements and photographs listed in plaintiff’s complaint); Burfoot v.
May4thCounts.com, No. CL102735 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 21, 2010) (ordering removal of website),
vacated, 80 Va. Cir. 306 (2010). 
244. See, e.g., Glassman, No. 102988/2012, at *3 (granting a temporary restraining order
because defendant failed to appear); Bat World Sanctuary, No. 352-248169-10 (enjoining the
publication of statements and photographs listed in plaintiff’s complaint). Paul Alan Levy, an
attorney who frequently defends clients facing speech injunctions, observed that “[t]hese
orders are often made because they are sought ex parte and the judge does not do original
research leading to clear law forbidding ex parte injunctions against speech, or because the
defendant’s lawyer lacks enough sophistication to recognize and argue the prior restraint
issue, or, in the end, because the trial judge just wants to do what he sees as fair.” Paul Alan
Levy, Prior Restraint Doctrine Protects Negative Yelp Review Against Preliminary Injunction,
CONSUMER L. & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 26, 2012), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2012/12/prior-
restraint-doctrine-protects-negative-yelp-review-against-preliminary-injunction.html.
245. See e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 606 (7th Cir. 2007); Animal
Rights Found. of Fla., Inc. v. Siegel, 867 So. 2d 451, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); St.
Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Am.
Broad. Cos. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 312 N.E.2d 85, 91-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974); Krebiozen
Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 134 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Mass. 1956); Hajek v. Bill Mowbray
Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983); Perez v. Dietz Dev., LLC, No. 122157, 2012 WL
6761997 (Va. Dec. 28, 2012); Burfoot, 80 Va. Cir. at 309.
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4. Type IV Injunctions
The narrowest of the four injunction categories is a “Type IV”
injunction, which only prohibits further publication, or orders the
removal of the specific statements a court or jury has found are
defamatory.246 The injunction approved by the California Supreme
Court in Balboa Island Village Inn is an example of a Type IV
injunction.247 It began, as many injunctions do, as an overbroad
restraint on the defendant’s ability to contact the plaintiff’s
employees and to film customers entering and leaving the plaintiff’s
establishment. The California Supreme Court, however, narrowed
the injunction so that it only prohibited the defendant “from
repeating to third persons statements about the Village Inn that
were determined at trial to be defamatory.”248
246. See Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992) (ordering trial court to
narrow injunction to cover information that was “the subject of the underlying suit”);
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1209 (6th Cir. 1990), (Wellford, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from affirming district court’s denial of an injunction
and limiting the “injunction to the statements which have been found in this and prior
proceedings to be false and libelous”); Am. Univ. of Antigua Coll. of Med. v. Woodward, 837
F. Supp. 2d 686, 701-02 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (prohibiting publication of eight enumerated
statements found to be defamatory); Int'l Profit Assoc., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672,
679-80 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (enjoining “defendants’ false representation that IPA offered to settle
with Paisola, and that as part of this settlement IPA agreed to pay Paisola and to allow
Paisola to participate in the management of the company”); Balboa Island Vill. Inn v. Lemen,
156 P.3d 339, 352 (Cal. 2007) (narrowing injunction so that it only prohibited the plaintiff
“personally from repeating her defamatory statements”); Wallace v. Cass, No. G036490, 2008
WL 626475, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2008) (instructing the lower court to narrowly draft
an injunction to prohibit defendant “from placing signs containing the kinds of statements
already adjudicated defamatory”); Noval v. Gorman, No. RIC 10020292, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 13, 2011); Advanced Training Sys., Inc., 352 N.W.2d at 11 (enjoining publication of
specific deceptive marketing materials); Griffis v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139,
at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002) (remanding to lower court to narrow injunction “so that
it restricts only those statements found to be defamatory”); Rombom v. Weberman, No.
1378100, 2002 WL 1461890, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002) (granting an injunction “to
the extent of directing defendants to remove any and all published statements about plaintiffs
and plaintiff Rombom’s family from their website ... found by the jury to be libelous”), aff’d,
766 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (App. Div. 2003).
247. 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see supra notes 218-
24 and accompanying text.
248. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 342. The injunction prohibited the defendant from
making the following defamatory statements about the plaintiff to third persons: “Plaintiff
sells alcohol to minors; Plaintiff stays open until 6:00 a.m.; Plaintiff makes sex videos;
Plaintiff is involved in child pornography; Plaintiff distributes illegal drugs; Plaintiff has
Mafia connections; Plaintiff encourages lesbian activities; Plaintiff participates in prostitution
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Because a Type IV injunction restrains only speech that a court
or jury has adjudged to be defamatory, it is unlikely to run afoul of
the prior restraint doctrine. But even these injunctions can still be
overbroad if the prohibition on the use of certain words is not
limited to specific contexts. For example, in Griffis v. Luban, the
plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a default judgment against a
commenter who had, among other things, called her a liar and
accused her of falsifying her credentials as an Egyptologist in an
Internet newsgroup.249 The trial court enjoined the defendant from
making a number of statements, including stating that the plaintiff
“is a liar.”250 The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the injunction,
but remanded to the lower court to narrow its scope:
[The trial] court found that Luban defamed Griffis by calling her
“a liar” with respect to Griffis’s postings to an Egyptology
newsgroup. As a result, the court enjoined Luban from saying
“that [Griffis] is a liar.” But because this provision is not
restricted to any particular context, i.e., postings to the Egypto-
logy newsgroup, the injunction has the effect of prohibiting
Luban from calling Griffis “a liar” even if to do so in another
context would not be defamatory. For example, the injunction
prohibits Luban from calling Griffis “a liar” even if Griffis were
to say that “John F. Kennedy was never President of the United
States.”251
 
As these cases demonstrate, even if constitutional and equitable
principles allow a judge to issue an injunction, drafting an injunc-
tion that will remedy the reputational harm a plaintiff is suffering,
without being overbroad or underinclusive, is a formidable chal-
lenge. The next section revisits this challenge and identifies
principles that can guide courts in crafting injunctions that are both
narrowly tailored and effective.
and acts as a whorehouse; Plaintiff serves tainted food.” Id.
249. No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002).
250. Id. at *6.
251. Id. at *6-7.
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IV. AN EQUITABLE REMEDY THAT ACCORDS WITH FREE SPEECH
PRINCIPLES 
The Supreme Court’s rhetoric strongly disfavoring speech
injunctions as prior restraints has led many commentators to
conclude that all injunctions in defamation cases are forbidden. As
Part II revealed, however, it is an overstatement to say that the
First Amendment bars every injunction that restrains speech. An
injunction targeting published speech that a court has found
defamatory would likely be constitutional. In fact, a narrowly
tailored injunction may be less burdensome on speech than
subsequent money damages because the injunction can specifically
target speech that is false and defamatory. As Professor John
Jeffries explains: 
There is less risk of deterring activities beyond the adjudicated
target of suppression—activities plainly outside the injunctive
ban but arguably within the necessarily more general prohibi-
tion of a penal law. And many find even an uncertain prospect
of criminal conviction and punishment sufficient incentive to
steer well clear of arguably proscribed activities. In terms,
therefore, of the system of free expression and of the aggregate
of arguably protected First Amendment activity that might be
inhibited under these regimes, it is anything but clear that
injunctions are more costly.252
 
Moreover, when the defendant engages in a continuing course of
conduct that requires the plaintiff to bring multiple damage actions,
an injunction may also be less burdensome on the parties and the
court.253 “If courts confine themselves to narrow injunctions against
specific communications instead of broad decrees, judicial supervi-
sion need be no more continuous than in damage actions.”254
If there is to be a formal retreat from the no-injunction rule, the
First Amendment and equitable principles necessitate that certain
safeguards accompany injunctions directed at defamatory speech.
252. Jeffries, supra note 135, at 429.
253. See Rendleman, supra note 15, at 357 (“[A]dministrative celerity may favor equity, for
injunctions may serve efficient, economical administration.”).
254. Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 996, 1009 (1965).
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These safeguards require that: (1) the injunction be preceded by a
judicial finding that the speech sought to be enjoined is defamatory;
(2) the defendant be given the opportunity to have a jury decide
whether the plaintiff has established all of the elements of defama-
tion; (3) the injunction be narrowly tailored so that it only targets 
speech that has been found to be defamatory; (4) the speech
restrained relates only to matters of private concern; and (5) the
plaintiff demonstrate that money damages are inadequate and that
an injunction will actually be effective in reducing her harm.
A. Requiring Full-Adjudication of Claims
As a threshold matter, no court should issue an injunction unless
it has found after a full and fair adversary proceeding that the
speech in question is defamatory. As the Supreme Court cautioned
in Pittsburgh Press Co., the “special vice of a prior restraint is that
[speech] will be suppressed ... before an adequate determination
that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.”255 This means that
a judge cannot issue a preliminary injunction, temporary restrain-
ing order, or any other restraint directed at defamatory speech
based on a mere “likelihood of success” or other speculative
standard.256 
Beyond the First Amendment concerns raised by such injunc-
tions, there are important practical reasons to be wary of courts
issuing injunctions before a case has come to completion. “The grant
or denial of a preliminary injunction is often the most crucial
decision a trial judge can make, one that has the frequent effect of
completely ending litigation” before a court has had an opportunity
to assess whether the speech in question is defamatory.257 This is
due both to the coercive power of judicial orders and to the realities
of the litigation process. Many defendants lack the money to file an
255. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973); see also Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 590 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
256. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. This is not a particularly controversial
requirement, as most scholars agree that preliminary injunctions in speech cases are highly
suspect. See, e.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 11, at 171; Siegel, supra note 1, at 735; Wells,
supra note 11, at 65.
257. John M. Newman, Note, Raising the Bar and the Public Interest: On Prior Restraints,
“Traditional Contours,” and Constitutionalizing Preliminary Injunctions in Copyright Law,
10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 323, 327 (2011).
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interlocutory appeal, if one is allowed, or the time to wait for a court
to rescind the injunction. As a result, they “face a Hobson’s choice:
They must remain silent, since if they speak their First Amendment
rights are no defense in subsequent contempt proceedings.”258 The
granting of an injunction, therefore, is often “the end of the ball
game; the parties simply cannot await the results of a full-scale
trial.”259
Once a court has made an adequate determination that the
targeted speech is defamatory, the First Amendment likely would
not preclude injunctive relief.260 The question, however, is how
exhaustive the finding of defamation must be and what procedural
safeguards are necessary to ensure that when speech is not properly
subject to restraint, it is protected.261 At a minimum, there must be
a finding on the merits that the speech is false and defamatory.262
It is less clear whether a plaintiff must also prove fault on the part
of the defendant, although the weight of authority seems to support
such a requirement.
The gravamen of a defamation claim is falsity, so no re-
lief—whether equitable or monetary—should be granted without a
determination that the speech is false and defamatory.263 If the
claim only involves a request for injunctive relief, however, the
plaintiff may argue that she need not also prove that the defendant
was at fault when he published the defamatory statement. Professor
Marc Franklin, a leading proponent of libel reform, has suggested
that a libel plaintiff should be able to obtain a declaratory judgment
that speech is false without the burden of proving fault.264 He and
258. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 793-94 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 774 (1982).
260. See supra notes 198-233 and accompanying text.
261. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 520
(1970) (“The government ... may regulate certain types of activity, but it must make sure, via
proper procedural safeguards, that protected speech is not the loser.”).
262. For a discussion of the elements of a defamation claim, see supra notes 263-65 and
accompanying text.
263. These are separate, although not always distinct, inquiries: not all false statements
of fact create actionable harm sufficient to support a defamation claim. Ardia, supra note 12,
at 282-95; accord Wolf v. Gold, 193 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (App. Div. 1959) (“Equity will not restrain
the publication of unjust and malicious matter simply on a showing of its falsity.”).
264. Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF.
L. REV. 809, 810 (1986). In return for this expansion of the scope of liability, Professor
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others who support declaratory judgment actions assert that the
elimination of libel damages would remove the “chilling effect” that
impelled the Supreme Court to interject a fault standard into the
common law tort of defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan.265
Regardless of whether a court could issue a declaratory judgment
without concluding that the defendant was at fault, it is almost
certainly the case that an injunction would not be constitutional
without such a finding.266 Although the defendant would not need to
pay monetary damages, an injunction is still a coercive sanction. In
Sullivan, the Court imposed a fault requirement because it recog-
nized that “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” and
speakers must have the breathing room necessary to risk errors in
order to engage in public discourse.267 A speaker who fears that a
court will enjoin him from speaking whenever he makes a mistake
will undoubtedly engage in the very same self-censorship the Court
worried about in Sullivan.268 
Moreover, speakers—even if they do not face the risk of a damage
award—must still contend with the litigation costs and threat of
reputational harm that come from having to defend against an
action for injunctive relief. As Rodney Smolla observed, “Whether a
suit is settled, won, or lost, the legal fees alone can be chilling. From
Franklin would preclude any recovery of damages and require that the plaintiff prove all
elements of the cause of action by clear and convincing evidence, including falsity. Id. at 832-
35.
265. See David A. Barrett, Libel Reform and Declaratory Judgments: A Better Alternative,
74 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 863-64 (1986); Franklin, supra note 264, at 820; Pierre N. Leval, The
No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287,
1289-90 (1988). 
266. There are a number of concerns associated with dropping the fault requirement,
including some that have been raised by its proponents. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Annenberg
Libel Reform Proposal, in REFORMING LIBEL LAW 229, 273-74 (John Soloski & Randall P.
Bezanson eds., 1992). Professor Smolla, an early backer of declaratory judgment actions,
conceded:
I have come to the conclusion that the ultimate empirical question whether the
declaratory judgment device will or will not excessively chill free speech cannot
be separated from the question of psychological perception. There is a self-
fulfilling quality to the phenomenon of chilling effects: If reporters perceive the
declaratory judgment as oppressive, they will act as if it is oppressive.
Id. at 274.
267. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
268. Cf. Smolla, supra note 266, at 274 (“Because so many journalists instinctively blanch
at any version of involuntary ‘truth trial,’ as a practical matter such a regime would tend to
chill free expression.”).
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the media’s perspective, the big chill in libel litigation comes more
from legal fees than from jury verdicts—for most jury verdicts are
overturned on appeal, while the legal bills come anyway.”269 The
high cost of defending a libel lawsuit has not gone unnoticed by
judges.270 In Sullivan, the Court’s rationale for imposing a fault
requirement rested, at least in part, on the self-censorship that
would result from a defendant’s “fear of the expense” of having to
prove that its speech is true.271 As others have noted, “It is inaccu-
rate, then, to isolate damage verdicts as the sole component of the
‘chilling effect’ of libel suits.”272
Permitting a court to grant injunctive relief without a finding of
fault would intolerably chill free speech and public debate. Defama-
tory statements that are published without the requisite degree of
fault are constitutionally protected and should not be considered
grounds for any form of relief, injunctive or otherwise.273 Conse-
quently, courts should require that plaintiffs establish all elements
of a defamation claim before considering whether an injunction is
appropriate. 
269. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 74 (1986). But see Franklin, supra note 264, at
820 (arguing that declaratory judgment actions would eliminate both the fear of large damage
awards and the “large and unrecoverable defense costs” that those awards induce).
270. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 610 n.40 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting a letter from the editor of a small town newspaper, which stated in part:
“We do not have spacious profits with which to defend ourselves and our principles, all the
way to the Supreme Court, each and every time we feel them to be under attack.”); Guccione
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he costs of defending against
the claim of libel ... can themselves impair vigorous freedom of expression.”); Seth Goodchild,
Media Counteractions: Restoring the Balance to Modern Libel Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 315, 324 n.58
(1986) (listing additional cases).
271. 376 U.S. at 279 (“[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because
of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”). 
272. Paul Gaffney, First Amendment Analysis of the Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal,
1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 601, 610 (1990).
273. See N.Y. Times Co., v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (“[N]either factual error nor
defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official
conduct.”); Lowell v. Hayes, 117 P.3d 745, 757 (Alaska 2005) (“In sum, where ‘false statements
of fact’ regarding a public figure are made without malicious intent, they are constitutionally
protected and should not be considered grounds for any form of relief, declaratory or
otherwise.”).
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B. Preserving the Jury’s Role as a Check on Judicial Power
Because jury participation is essential to the proper functioning
of defamation law, juries must be an integral part of any system of
injunctive relief. The no-injunction rule serves as an important
constraint on a judge’s ability to unilaterally censor speech. To
preserve this check on judicial power, juries must be involved in at
least two ways. First, no injunction should be issued unless a jury
determines that the plaintiff established all of the elements of her
defamation claim, or the defendant waived his right to a jury trial.
Second, if a party is charged with contempt for violating an
injunction, a jury should be empanelled to assess whether the
injunction’s terms have been violated and whether the speech at
issue is false and defamatory.
As discussed in Part II, juries play a critical role in defamation
cases, not only in terms of assessing whether speech is defamatory,
but also “as a tribune of the people; to be a popular institution with
veto power over government sanctions for speech.”274 This is not to
say that juries always protect defendants from government
censorship, particularly when the speaker is accused of espousing
views that challenge prevailing orthodoxy. The casebooks are rife
with appellate decisions criticizing juries for punishing speakers
who have done little more than offend a community’s sensibilities.
This has led some scholars to question the reliance on juries to
protect First Amendment rights, warning that “when public
sentiment [runs] strongly in favor of the government, juries could
readily become ex post facto censors ... in libel cases.”275 Indeed, the
Supreme Court recently observed in Snyder v. Phelps that when the
jury “dislike[s] particular expression,” it is “‘unlikely to be neutral
with respect to the content of [the] speech,’ posing a real danger of
becoming an instrument for the suppression of ... expression.”276 
274. Siegel, supra note 1, at 729.
275. Monaghan, supra note 261, at 528-29; see also Frederick Schauer, The Role of the
People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 765 (1986); Siegel, supra note 1, at
729.
276. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 510 (1984)).
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But the fact that juries do not always serve as a bulwark against
government overreaching does not mean they are superfluous.
Times change and public sentiment may shift, especially if jurors
perceive that government or other powerful interests are using
defamation law to stifle criticism.277 Although imperfect, juries
remain an important part of the checks and balances within our free
speech jurisprudence.278 These checks allow judges to limit the
power of juries through procedural devices, such as summary
judgment, directed verdicts, and judgments non obstante
veredicto.279 Meanwhile, judges themselves are subject to independ-
ent appellate review in defamation cases280 and are constrained in
their ability to enjoin speech through the no-injunction rule. As the
historian Stephen Siegel notes, “[T]he no injunction for defamation
rule was part of a system of free speech that barred government
from censoring or punishing speech without popular participation
and approval.”281
The right to have a jury determine whether the elements of a
defamation claim have been established must exist even in cases in
which the plaintiff only requests equitable relief. Concededly, this
would require a change in the way most courts handle injunctions.
Unlike money damages, which are awarded by the fact finder, a
judge typically determines on her own whether an injunction is
warranted. Although the judge can take a jury’s findings into
account when fashioning such a remedy, there is no requirement in
most states that she do so.282 “For fair or for foul, the injunction
277. See, e.g., The Trial of Mr. John Peter Zenger (1735), 17 HOWELL’S ST. TRIALS 675
(1816); LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 166 (“[J]uries sometimes provide another layer of protection
for speech ... [and] might have protected labor speakers in the heyday of the antistrike
injunction, or antiwar speakers in the late stages of the Vietnam War.”).
278. See, e.g., RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 27 (2003) (“[J]uries fit
into an overall scheme of a government of checks and balances.”).
279. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 443-45, 489-91 (1996).
280. See Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 502-11 (requiring de novo review by appellate courts over
findings of actual malice in defamation cases).
281. Siegel, supra note 1, at 729. Even those who have been critical of the no-injunction
rule acknowledge that the desire to ensure jury participation in defamation cases is an
important rationale for refusing to grant injunctive relief. See, e.g., Bertlesman, supra note
6, at 323; Pound, supra note 6, at 656-57; Robert Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal
Integrity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 147, 153-54 (1969).
282. See Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1645; Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The
Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 615-16 (2001). Several states do appear to provide a jury
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process concentrates power in the judge to find the facts, apply the
law, formulate relief, and enforce the order.”283 
Under a system in which juries do not play a role in awarding
injunctive relief, plaintiffs could only request an injunction in order
to deprive their opponents of a jury trial.284 In fact, in a number of
defamation cases in which plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, they
did not also ask for money damages.285 Although there is no way to
know whether these plaintiffs only requested an injunction to avoid
a jury trial, the end result is the same: a remedy that is solely at the
discretion of the judge. The no-injunction rule has traditionally
limited such strategic behavior.286 If the rule is relaxed, trial by jury
should be an option for all defendants who are facing requests for
injunctive relief. 
C. Ensuring Narrow Tailoring
Even if a court or jury has determined that speech is defamatory,
it does not automatically follow that any injunction would be an
appropriate or constitutional remedy. In Tory v. Cochran, the
injunction followed a three-day bench trial,287 yet the Supreme
Court still held that it was unconstitutional.288 In vacating the
injunction, Justice Breyer made a point of noting that “the injunc-
trial even in actions for equitable relief. See M.T. Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases,
31 N.C. L. REV. 157, 158 (1953) (noting the practice in Georgia, Texas, Tennessee, and North
Carolina). Arizona also provides for a right to a jury trial in equity, “although the verdict is
only advisory,” Mozes v. Daru, 420 P.2d 957, 963 (Ariz. 1966), as does Louisiana, see Bonneau
v. Blalock, 484 So. 2d 275 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
283. Rendleman, supra note 47, at 1650; see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S.
753, 793 (1994) (“The right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a
single man or woman.”) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); FELIX
FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 189-91 (1930) (voicing concern
about the power of a single judge in labor injunction cases).
284. LAYCOCK, supra note 5, at 213-14.
285. See, e.g., Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 735-36 (2005); Goldblum v. Nat’l Broad. Corp.,
584 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Am. Broad. Co., 441 F.2d 1396, 1397 (6th Cir.
1971); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 341 (Cal. 2007).
286. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
287. No. BC239405, 2002 WL 34075951 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002). The trial judge
bifurcated the case and “proceeded to hear and adjudicate the factual and legal questions
necessary to determine whether Cochran was entitled to the permanent injunctive relief he
sought.” Id. Tory, who represented himself, apparently did not object to the absence of a jury.
288. See supra notes 172-87 and accompanying text.
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tion, as written, amounts to an overly broad prior restraint on
speech.”289 Indeed, how could it not be overbroad when it restrained
Ulysses Tory and his wife from saying anything about Johnnie
Cochran in any public forum, including statements lauding
Cochran’s representation of O.J. Simpson? Far from being narrowly
tailored, the injunction reached beyond the specific statements the
trial court found defamatory.
It is a central precept of First Amendment law that content-based
restrictions on speech must be precise and narrowly tailored.290
Narrow tailoring in this context requires that an injunction directed
at defamatory speech must not be overinclusive and must be the
least restrictive alternative available to achieve a compelling
government interest.291 In other words, an injunction is not narrowly
tailored if it restricts non-defamatory speech.292 Nor is it narrowly
tailored “if there are less speech-restrictive means available that
would serve the interest essentially as well as would the speech
restriction.”293 
Because a court has no power to restrain speech that is not
defamatory or otherwise amenable to sanction under the First
Amendment, narrow tailoring requires that an injunction must be
limited to speech that has previously been uttered or published.294
It would not otherwise be possible for a court or jury to make the
necessary factual finding of defamation.295 Whether a statement is
defamatory is a highly fact-specific inquiry. Courts are instructed
not to evaluate a statement in isolation; they must take into account
contextual factors such as the time, place, and manner of the
289. Tory, 544 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added).
290. See id. at 738 (stating that an “order issued in ‘the area of First Amendment rights’
must be ‘precis[e]’ and narrowly ‘tailored’ to achieve the ‘pin-pointed objective’ of the ‘needs
of the case’”) (quoting Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84
(1968)). 
291. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2421-22 (1996).
292. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973).
293. Volokh, supra note 291, at 2422.
294. See supra Part II.B. 
295. As Justice Blackmun warned, “[i]t is always difficult to know in advance what an
individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely
drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.” See Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
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speech.296 Accordingly, a court cannot determine whether speech is
properly subject to an injunction unless it can examine the specific
words used and the setting in which their expression occurs.297
Injunctions that prohibit future speech on the basis of speculation
about what might be said or how it might be expressed invariably
lack a factual basis for a finding of defamation.298
Exploring how a narrowly tailored injunction could be used in
practice will help to illustrate the appropriate scope of injunctive
relief. First, it is clear that Type I injunctions, which order the
defendant to desist from saying anything about the plaintiff, as was
the case in Tory v. Cochran, are not permissible.299 Similarly, Type
II injunctions, which order the defendant not to utter any defama-
tory statements about the plaintiff, are overbroad because they are
not precise enough to put the defendant on notice as to what speech
will violate the injunction.300
Narrow tailoring requires that an injunction must clearly
identify—and be limited to—the specific statements the court or
jury has found are defamatory. For example, if a single page on a
website is held to be defamatory, an injunction must be limited to
only prohibiting the further publication of that page; if an injunction
orders the removal of the entire website, it is impermissibly
overbroad. This rules out Type III injunctions. Such injunctions,
296. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970); David A.
Logan, Of “Sloppy Journalism,” “Corporate Tyranny,” and Mea Culpas: The Curious Case of
Moldea v. New York Times, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 193 n.210 (1995) (“In real estate, the
three most important factors are ‘location, location and location;’ in defamation law the three
most important factors in determining whether you have a defamatory factual statement ...
are ‘context, context and context.’”) (quoting Karl Olson On Review, a New Standard for
Reviews, RECORDER, May 25, 1994); see also Jeffrey E. Thomas, A Pragmatic Approach to
Meaning in Defamation Law, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 345-51 (1999) (explaining the
importance of context in ascertaining defamatory meaning).
297. See Griffis v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5,
2002) (noting the importance of context in determining whether speech is defamatory); cf.
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (“[T]he line between permissible
advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting
in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say.”).
298. See Blasi, supra note 161, at 87 (“[A] major element in the case for a presumption
against prior restraint is the undesirably abstract quality of any adjudication that occurs prior
to the time the communication at issue is initially disseminated to the public.”).
299. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (holding that the injunction was overbroad); see
also supra note 237 (citing cases rejecting Type I injunctions).
300. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (citing cases rejecting Type II injunctions).
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because they are not limited to statements that have been found to
be defamatory, invariably fail the narrow tailoring requirement by
enjoining speech that is not properly subject to any sanction.301 
This leaves Type IV injunctions, which only prohibit the publica-
tion of the specific statements a court or jury has found are defama-
tory. Saadi v. Maroun, which was discussed in Part I, provides an
illustration of a narrowly tailored Type IV injunction.302 In that
case, the jury found that the defendant defamed Mr. Saadi by
posting statements online falsely stating that he was a terrorist, a
criminal, and that he had received money stolen from the Lebanese
government.303 After the jury awarded $90,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages,304 the district court issued a permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant from continuing to publish the
“statements contained in Trial Exhibits 19 and 20 that were found
by the jury to be defamatory.”305 The court made it clear that “the
scope of the injunction must be limited to those statements.”306 
Several other courts have issued similarly narrow Type IV
injunctions.307 Because such injunctions are limited to speech that
has been found to be defamatory, and thus subject to government
sanction under the First Amendment, they would not be
impermissibly overbroad. 
D. Allowing Robust Debate on Issues of Public Concern
Even a narrowly tailored injunction will still be problematic,
however, if it restricts a speaker’s ability to engage in public debate.
Because speech on public issues receives heightened protection
under the Constitution, injunctions directed at defamatory speech
must be limited to speech on matters of private concern.308 There are
301. See supra note 245 (citing cases rejecting Type III injunctions).
302. No. 807-CV-01976-T-24-MAP, 2009 WL 3617788 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2009).
303. See id. at *1; Saadi v. Maroun, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, www.dmlp.org/
threats/saadi-v-maroun (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
304. Saadi, 2009 WL 3617788, at *1.
305. Id. at *3.
306. Id.
307. See supra note 246 (citing cases granting or affirming Type IV injunctions).
308. As Professor Siegel observes, “[T]here is the principle that no injunction should issue
when the defamatory speech involves a matter of public interest. That principle is of such
obvious constitutional dimension that it was recognized by the Balboa Island court ... and is
recommended by all commentators who oppose the no-injunction rule.” Siegel, supra note 1,
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three reasons for imposing this requirement. First, the First
Amendment’s protections are greatest when speech relates to a
matter of public concern. Second, the State’s interest in providing an
injunctive remedy is less substantial when the speech involves a
matter of public concern. Third, injunctions directed at speech on
matters of public concern are less likely to be effective because the
court would be attempting to restrain speech that is of widespread
interest.
Speech on matters of public concern has long received additional
solicitude under the First Amendment.309 As the Supreme Court has
admonished, speech on matters of public concern “occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is
entitled to special protection.”310 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly
held that the First Amendment protects such speech, even if it is
offensive and harmful.311 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court emphasized the “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open.”312 This debate would be excessively chilled, the
Court reasoned, if speakers faced liability for every erroneous
statement.313
In contrast, speech solely on matters of private concern has
received far less First Amendment protection.314 This divergent
treatment first appeared in the defamation context in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., in which the Court held
at 736 n.434 (citing Bertlesman, supra note 6, at 322; Gold, supra note 6, at 257–58; Robert
Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 147, 159 (1964)).
309. Such speech, according to the Court, “is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s
protection.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)
(quoting First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)); see also Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971)); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Robinson v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 441 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1971) (refusing to grant an injunction directed at
allegedly defamatory speech and noting that “[e]specially when discussion centers around
matters of public concern or public interest, zealous protection of First Amendment rights is
required”). 
310. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983)).
311. See, e.g., Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1219; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941).
312. 376 U.S. at 270.
313. Id. at 271-72.
314. See Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 172, 192 (2011).
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that punitive damages can be awarded without a showing of “actual
malice” when the defamation is not on a matter of public concern.315
In Dun & Bradstreet, a plurality of the Court concluded that a state
could award presumed and punitive damages because of the
“reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of
public concern.”316 States could not, according to the Court’s prior
decisions in Sullivan and Gertz, award such damages without a
showing of actual malice when the speech involved a public official
or a matter of public concern.317
A number of scholars have criticized the Court’s efforts to distin-
guish speech on matters of public concern because it has led, in some
cases, to a category of privileged “public issue” speech that alone is
given protection under the First Amendment.318 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court further ingrained the distinction in First Amend-
ment doctrine in Snyder v. Phelps, which held that the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort cannot be used to impose
315. 472 U.S. 479, 761 (1985). More than a decade before Dun & Bradstreet, a plurality of
the Court held in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. that the actual malice standard applied
even in private figure libel cases if the defamatory statements were about the plaintiff’s
“involvement in an event of public or general interest,” 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971), but the
Rosenbloom plurality’s reliance on the subject matter of the speech was subsequently rejected
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., where the Court focused on the plaintiff’s status, 418 U.S. 323,
343 (1974).
316. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749.
317. Dun & Bradstreet only involved one of the two limitations on defamation actions
established in Gertz, which held that even private figure plaintiffs must prove fault and
cannot recover punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at
349. Justice White noted in his concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet that “it must be that the
Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in
cases [not involving matters of public concern],” 472 U.S. at 774 (White, J., concurring), but
the Court did not answer that question in Dun & Bradstreet. One year later, the Court noted
in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps that this was not merely an oversight, remarking that
“[w]hen the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in
Dun & Bradstreet, the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at
least some of the features of the common-law landscape.” 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). 
318. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable
Standard Mingles with News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 40 (2012).
Distinguishing between speech on matters of public and private concern initially arose as an
effort by courts to identify expressive conduct that should receive heightened First
Amendment protection, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The
Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990), but has
since become a test that courts apply to determine whether speech is entitled to any First
Amendment protection, see Calvert, supra, at 42-43 (describing the test’s application in
privacy, government employee speech, and reporter’s privilege cases).
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liability if the distress is caused by speech on a matter of public
concern.319 Chief Justice Roberts explained that government efforts
to restrict speech on matters of public concern raise additional
constitutional problems: 
Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding [the defendant]
liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that
speech is of public or private concern....“[N]ot all speech is of
equal First Amendment importance,” however, and where
matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amend-
ment protections are often less rigorous. That is because
restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate
the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters
of public interest: “[T]here is no threat to the free and robust
debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a
meaningful dialogue of ideas”; and the “threat of liability” does
not pose the risk of “a reaction of self-censorship” on matters of
public import.320
In addition to receiving heightened protection under the First
Amendment, speech on matters of public concern also implicates
less substantial state interests in providing judicial remedies for
those harmed by the speech.321 Put simply, the government’s
interest in providing an injunctive remedy for plaintiffs is not as
significant when the speech relates to a matter of public concern
because such plaintiffs likely have the ability to counteract false
statements themselves. Whether we examine the state’s interest as
part of the traditional balancing of interests that courts apply when
evaluating equitable remedies,322 or as an element in the strict
scrutiny test under the First Amendment, which requires a
“compelling government interest,”323 some examination of the state’s
interest in providing an injunctive remedy is necessary before a
court can issue an injunction. 
319. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011).
320. Id. at 1215-16 (internal citations omitted).
321. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (“In Gertz, we found that the state interest in
awarding presumed and punitive damages was not ‘substantial’ in view of their effect on
speech at the core of First Amendment concern.”).
322. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 43, § 2.9, at 227-30 (describing how courts balance the
equities before granting injunctive relief).
323. See Volokh, supra note 291, at 2418-21.
72 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:001
Of course, the reason for considering an equitable remedy in the
first place is the belief that an injunction will provide benefits to the
plaintiff that surpass what is already available to her, including
self-help.324 When the speech relates to a matter of public concern,
however, a defamed party likely will have an interested—if not
always receptive—audience for her counterspeech because the issue
is of interest to the community.325 As a result, an injunction directed
at speech that relates to a matter of public concern may not be
supported by a compelling state interest because an effective self-
help remedy likely exists.326 
The preference for self-help is deeply embedded in First Amend-
ment doctrine and necessitates that courts look to the availability
of private remedies, including counterspeech, in determining
whether the state has a compelling interest in the proposed remedy
and whether the government restriction on speech is the least
restrictive means available.327 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., for
example, the Court required that public figures must prove actual
malice to make out a defamation claim, noting that they have
greater opportunity to redress the harm caused by defamatory
speech.328 According to the Court:
324. See Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology
Upgrades Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 778 (2003). Professor Tom Bell
defines “self-help” as “a private party’s act, neither prohibited nor compelled by law, of
preventing or remedying a legal wrong without any public official’s assistance.” Id. at 744 n.5.
325. Speech on matters of “public concern” and speech that is of “public interest” are not
necessarily coterminous, although the line separating the two categories is difficult to draw.
See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV.
27, 34-37 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v.
Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 1999) (stating that when speech relates to a matter
of public concern, “we believe that in most instances there is little disparity in the ability of
private versus public individuals to obtain access ‘to the channels of effective communication’
in order to ‘counteract false statements’”).
326. See Bell, supra note 324, at 749-69; cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free
Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2000) (“Given
that there are ways for private actors to protect original content through voluntary
transactions, the government arguably does not have a compelling interest in restricting
speech through copyright.”).
327. See Bell, supra note 324, at 749-69; Aaron Perzanowski, Relative Access to Corrective
Speech: A New Test for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 833, 845-47 (2006). But see
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 526 (1991) (calling
the self-help argument an “unconvincing rationalization[ ]”).
328. 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). The Gertz Court also stated that public figures should have
2013] SPEECH, DEFAMATION, AND INJUNCTIONS 73
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error
and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and
hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy.329
To be clear, a rule that limits injunctive relief to speech on
matters of private concern will make it very difficult for public
officials and public figures to get an injunction because speech that
defames such plaintiffs will typically relate to a matter of public
concern. But this section advances an argument that goes one step
further, barring injunctions even in cases involving private figures
if the speech relates to a matter of public concern. Although Gertz
involved the legal distinctions that flow from the public figure
status of the plaintiff, the rationale the Court relied on for imposing
a heightened standard of fault on public figures—that they can
utilize self-help—is applicable in the context of any speech that
implicates a matter of public concern, even when the person being
discussed is a private figure. After all, counterspeech is a viable
alternative for public officials and public figures because the public
has an interest in their activities. This is not to say, of course, that
every plaintiff will be able to effectively counteract defamatory
speech that relates to a matter of public concern, but in those cases
where they can, the state’s interest in providing an injunction will
be substantially diminished.330
to prove actual malice because they voluntarily “assumed roles of especial [sic] prominence
in the affairs of society.” Id. at 345. 
329. Id. at 344; see also Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-69 (1979)
(“[P]ublic figures are less vulnerable to injury from defamatory statements because of their
ability to resort to effective ‘self-help.’ They usually enjoy significantly greater access than
private individuals to channels of effective communication, which enable them through
discussion to counter criticism and expose the falsehood and fallacies of defamatory
statements.”).
330. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Nw. Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580,
587 (Ind. App. 1974) (rejecting a lower standard of fault for private figure plaintiffs and
concluding that “[d]rawing a distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ figures makes no sense
in terms of our constitutional guarantees of free speech and press”).
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Furthermore, when speech relates to a matter of public concern
and the plaintiff can engage in self-help through counterspeech, an
injunction will not be the least restrictive remedy available.331
Because “courts seek the most efficient means of alleviating the
social costs of free speech,”332 the availability of self-help must serve
as a limit on the issuance of injunctive relief in defamation cases. In
his concurrence in Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis explained
why corrective self-help was a preferred remedy: “If there be time to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence.”333 
Indeed, one of the rationales underlying the no-injunction rule is
that speakers should be able to contest their sanction not only in a
court of law, but also in the court of public opinion.334 First Amend-
ment protections have long been justified by the idea that “the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”335 Injunctions that prohibit speech from
entering the public sphere distort the marketplace of ideas.336 By
prohibiting the government from restraining speech before its public
dissemination, the no-injunction rule permits speakers to present
their speech to their fellow citizens and potentially convince them
that they should not face sanction; “when the Government seeks to
punish the most effective speakers, it runs the risk that the people
will see this as punishment for eloquence, not criminality.”337 
Moreover, when speech relates to a matter of public concern, some
speakers may actually be more interested in succeeding in the court
of public opinion than in a court of law. Professor Harry Kalven
believes this objective led the defendants to publish the Pentagon
Papers:
331. See Bell, supra note 324, at 762-69; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding
Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 157 (1997).
332. Id. at 763.
333. 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
334. See Siegel, supra note 1.
335. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
336. See Bendor, supra note 135, at 314 (“The central rationale for the doctrine of prior
restraint and its recognized exceptions is the production of maximal amounts of speech.”).
337. See Brief Amici Curiae of Historians, supra note 67, at 45.
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It is, I think, reasonably clear that Daniel Ellsberg, and also the
New York Times and Washington Post, were engaged in a kind
of political action, akin to civil disobedience. Their belief in the
value of what they were doing was so high that they were willing
to publish and take the consequences. The point was to get the
message to the public. Therefore in this context prior and
subsequent restraints are not coterminous.338
Finally, injunctions that target speech on matters of public
concern are more likely to be ineffective at stopping the continued
dissemination of defamatory speech. Speech on matters of public
concern naturally engenders greater public interest. By attempting
to restrain members of a community “from discussing a subject
intimately affecting life within it,”339 an injunction directed at such
speech will face significant efficacy challenges. The next section
explores this issue more fully, but it is sufficient to note here that
an injunction targeting speech on a matter of public concern will
raise such challenges.
Of course, the line between speech on matters of public and
private concern can sometimes be difficult to draw.340 Although
much work remains to be done in formulating a consistent approach
to divining this line, the Supreme Court has offered some guidance
to lower courts in making this determination. In Snyder v. Phelps,
the Court instructed that:
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
338. Harry Kalven, Jr., Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 34
(1971).
339. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976) (invalidating gag order on the
press and remarking that “plainly a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing
a subject intimately affecting life within it”).
340. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-18 (2011); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen
Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 578-79 (2007) (“Making legal
distinctions based on whether the content is a matter of public concern or newsworthy has
posed significant difficulties in a number of different areas of media law.”). In Dun &
Bradstreet, for example, the plurality held that a credit report falsely reporting a company’s
bankruptcy was not a matter of public concern. This sentiment “would surprise the company’s
employees, creditors, and customers, as well as local journalists who might well cover the
bankruptcy of even a small company in their small town.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 697, 744 (2003).
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concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value
and concern to the public.341
Conversely, speech that is “solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific ... audience,” is not speech on a matter of
public concern.342 
The reality is that courts already apply the distinction between
speech on matters of public concern and private concern in a
number of doctrinal areas,343 including in defamation law, where
several states use it to determine the level of fault a plaintiff must
prove in order to make out a prima facie claim for libel.344 Further-
more, a handful of courts have relied on the distinction between
public and private concern when assessing whether an injunction
341. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004); see
also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492–94 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
387–88 (1967). Commentators have come up with their own definitions as well. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 481 (1997)
(defining public discourse as “the speech necessary for the formation of public opinion”).
342. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985). For a
court to determine whether defamatory speech is of public or private concern, it must examine
the “content, form, and context” of that speech, “as revealed by the whole record.” Id. at 761
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48) (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. See Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 516 A.2d 220, 230 (N.J. 1986) (citing cases);
Papandrea, supra note 340, at 579-80 (describing its application in defamation and privacy
cases). 
344. See, e.g., Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 985 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that
under New York law, private figures involved in matters of public concern must show that the
defendant was “grossly irresponsible”); Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d
1103, 1110 (Colo. 1982) (requiring that private figure plaintiffs prove actual malice in cases
involving matters of public or general concern); Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712
N.E.2d 446, 453 (Ind. 1999) (adopting actual malice standard in all cases involving matters
of public or general concern).
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directed at defamatory speech is345 or is not346 an unconstitutional
prior restraint. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in
Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press is illustrative of the
reasoning courts have applied when analyzing whether speech on
a matter of public interest should be enjoined.347 In Krebiozen, the
345. See Robinson v. Am. Broad. Cos., 441 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1971) (refusing to
grant injunction and noting, “Especially when discussion centers around matters of public
concern or public interest, zealous protection of First Amendment rights is required”); Crosby
v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissolving injunction that barred a credit-
reporting agency from reporting that the past proprietor of a business had been convicted of
fraud and noting that “[s]uch an injunction, enforceable through the contempt power,
constitutes a prior restraint by the United States against the publication of facts which the
community has a right to know”); Lassiter v. Lassiter, 456 F. Supp. 2d 876, 884 (E.D. Ky.
2006) (stating that no injunction should issue where subject matter is “imbued with the public
interest”), aff’d, 280 F. App’x 503 (6th Cir. 2008); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 325–26
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the speech was “arguably within the sphere of legitimate public
concern, which imbues the speech with a heavy presumption of constitutional protection”)
(quoting Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Queen v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 508 F. Supp. 532, 536 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (“[I]n
view of the public interest in energy conservation and energy saving devices, we hold that
plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory and injunctive relief must be denied.”), aff’d, 689 F.2d 80 (6th
Cir. 1982); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that an injunction “is not permissible for either a publication or a
republication of a statement of public interest”); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co.,
312 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (reversing injunction and noting the “television
segment in question dealing with the combustibility of a baby crib was a matter of great
public interest”); Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 n.2 (Ky. 2010); Krebiozen
Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 134 N.E.2d 1, 6-8 (Mass. 1956) (refusing to grant
injunction prohibiting publication of book about plaintiff because research on the alleged
cancer drug was a matter of public interest); Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 158 N.W. 358, 359 (Neb.
1916) (“It follows that a court cannot use its equity powers to prevent the publication of
political matter.”).
346. See Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-CV-386-SEB-JMS, 2009 WL 1035265, at *5 (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 17, 2009) (granting preliminary injunction and stating the “statements do not materially
advance society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues”
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
224 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D. Or. 1963) (concluding that the “language of the sign ... pertains only
to the interest of the parties involved in the controversy [and is] not in the public interest or
for the public interest”); Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming
injunction and noting, “We believe that the speech enjoined by the preliminary injunction is
of little constitutional import and that the injunction primarily operates to address alleged
private wrongs”); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App. Div. 1992) (affirming
injunction and concluding that allegation of rape “does not advance ... societal interests and,
indeed, concerns a private individual”); Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 834 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1976) (finding no public interest), rev’d, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978).
347. 134 N.E. 2d at 7.
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plaintiff filed suit to permanently enjoin the publication of a book it
claimed falsely impugned a cancer drug it was developing.348 The
court refused to grant the injunction, noting that the effectiveness
of the drug was a matter of public interest:
The establishment of the truth about Krebiozen as soon as
possible is critically important to the public. If it is a cure it will
be one of the great discoveries of modern times.... We grant that
it could conceivably be here, as claimed, that this attack which
the demurrer admits for present purposes to be false and
defamatory will impede progress in the testing of Krebiozen. But
basing a rule on that possibility would end or at least effectively
emasculate discussion in the very controversial fields where it
is most important.349
As a coda to its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court made it clear
that the public interest in the speech was determinative: “The
constitutional protections are clear and controlling, but were they
absent, the weight, in the balance, of the public interest in the
discussion of cancer cures would be sufficient basis here for the
denial of an injunction.”350
E. Demonstrating Effectiveness
Before a court may issue any injunction, even one that is
narrowly tailored and only directed at speech on a matter of private
concern, the plaintiff must demonstrate that money damages are an
inadequate remedy and the injunction will actually be effective in
reducing her harm. Under both constitutional and equitable
principles, an injunction that does not offer additional benefits to a
plaintiff, beyond what money damages provide, is not a suitable
remedy. 
As noted in Part II, in most cases it should be relatively easy for
a plaintiff to establish that money damages are an inadequate
remedy. It may not be so easy, however, for many of these plaintiffs
to also show that injunctive relief will be effective in reducing their
348. Id. at 2.
349. Id. at 7.
350. Id. at 9.
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reputational harms. Where injunctions directed at speech are
concerned, effectiveness is not a given. When a court issues an
injunction, a speaker does not suddenly lose his voice. Words do not
disappear from the page. Digital bits do not dissolve into the ether.
An injunction’s effectiveness is dependent on the behavior of
individuals who weigh the benefits of continuing to engage in the
proscribed conduct against the likelihood and costs of sanction if
they are found to be in violation.351
Although a plaintiff may argue that an injunction is a valuable
form of vindication regardless of whether it is effective in stopping
further reputational harm, courts have been reluctant to recognize
such an attenuated benefit as a sufficient justification for granting
an injunction.352 Equitable relief is discretionary, and judges are
naturally disinclined to waste their resources and risk undermining
respect for the legal system by issuing an order that will be
ineffectual or ignored.353 Moreover, “[w]here an injunction is
351. John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “OFF Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2012) (“In practical situations,
an injunction might amount to little more than a threat of higher-than-normal monetary
sanctions delivered at higher-than-normal speed.”).
352. See, e.g., In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating orders
enjoining the publication of names mentioned in grand jury proceedings because “the cat [was]
out of the bag.... [t]he district court did not close the hearing and the disclosure was made in
the courtroom, a particularly public forum”); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342,
1351 (1st Cir. 1986) (refusing to enjoin the publication of law enforcement records referencing
the plaintiff, in part because “portions of the information disclosed by the FBI had already
been ‘disseminated’ by the media,” and “[i]t is therefore hard to imagine a finding that the
prior restraint would accomplish its purpose”).
353. See, e.g., Oakley v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(quoting Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 171) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)) (noting that a narrowly tailored injunction would “be useless because a
defendant [could] avoid its restrictions by making the same point using different words”);
Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The Court
is not convinced that Plaintiffs have made an adequate showing that any restraining
injunction in this case would serve its intended purpose.”); Jordan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 280
F. Supp. 2d 104,112 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that it would be impossible for an injunction to
be sufficiently narrow while also preventing the defendant from making defamatory
statements); Devine v. Devine, 90 A.2d 126, 129 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (noting the
“inherent difficulties involved in the enforcement” of a proposed injunction preventing the
plaintiff’s mother-in-law from making defamatory statements that would damage the
plaintiff’s marriage); Frick v. Stevens, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 6, 29 (C.P. Cumberland Cnty. 1967)
(observing that “injunctive relief cannot be applied with practical success in this case and
without imposing an impossible burden on the court, or bringing its processes into disrepute”). 
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unenforceable, it is difficult to see that it has a greater vindicatory
effect than an award of damages.”354
The admonition that a court must assess whether an injunction
will be effective is both a long-standing equitable principle355 and an
essential part of a court’s assessment of whether a restriction on
speech is constitutional. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned
that the government may not suppress speech by means that are
ineffective,356 or that fail to serve,357 further,358 or directly advance359
the state’s interest. We see this quite clearly in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, which invalidated an
injunction that restricted the press’s ability to report certain
“implicative” information about a murder defendant.360 Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Burger instructed that judges must “assess
the probable efficacy of [a] prior restraint on publication as a
workable method” and “cannot ignore the reality of the problems of
managing” such orders.361 Among the challenges he identified were
the limited “territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court” and the need
for personal jurisdiction, which “presents an obstacle to a restrain-
ing order that applies to publication at large.”362 Examining the
likely effectiveness of the gag order issued by the trial court, Chief
Justice Burger concluded:
[T]he events disclosed by the record took place in a community
of 850 people. It is reasonable to assume that, without any news
accounts being printed or broadcast, rumors would travel swiftly
354. Normann Witzleb, ‘Equity Does Not Act in Vain’: An Analysis of Futility Arguments
in Claims for Injunctions, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 503, 506 (2010).
355. See JOSEPH ALEXANDER SHEARWOOD & CLEMENT SMILES MOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 8 (1885) (“When the Court cannot effectually carry out what it
attempts, it will not attempt to do so at all; for it will not submit to be made an object of
ridicule by an ineffectual performance.”).
356. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976); Eric B. Easton, Closing
the Barn Door After the Genie Is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a “Futility Principle” in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (1995); see also Volokh, supra note 291,
at 2421-22.
357. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982).
358. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
359. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980). 
360. Stuart, 424 U.S. at 541, 570.
361. Id. at 565.
362. Id. at 565-66.
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by word of mouth. One can only speculate on the accuracy of
such reports, given the generative propensities of rumors; they
could well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news
accounts. But plainly a whole community cannot be restrained
from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it.363
As Chief Justice Burger noted, speech injunctions may also be
ineffective because of the limits of judicial authority.364 A court
cannot enforce its decrees beyond its geographic boundaries nor can
it exercise power over parties who are not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court.365 As a result, principles of due process and
state sovereignty limit a court’s ability to compel parties to cease or
refrain from speech activities. Unlike money damages, which can be
enforced anywhere a defendant has assets, injunctions are in
personam orders; if an injunction is to be effective in restraining
speech, the court must be able to reach every speaker and extend its
jurisdiction to the locations where the speech is being dissemi-
nated.366 
Moreover, even when judicial power can reach the speech in
question, there is reason to question whether an injunction will
have sufficient practical effect to be worthwhile. All speech now has
digital echoes.367 In order to be effective, an injunction must
therefore restrain speech in multiple communication mediums.368
This requires the plaintiff to be able to identify where the defama-
363. Id. at 567.
364. Id. at 565-66 (noting the limited “territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court” and the
need for personal jurisdiction, which “presents an obstacle to a restraining order that applies
to publication at large”); see also Frick v. Stevens, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 6, 29 (C.P. Cumberland
Cnty. 1967) (“Injunctive relief cannot be applied in this case with practical success because
the court lacks jurisdiction to order the publisher and distributor, Random House, Inc., of New
York, to change the publication, as they are without the jurisdiction and not parties to this
suit.”).
365. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 404 (1985).
366. See Witzleb, supra note 354, at 520. 
367. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
368. Cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (invalidating statute that applied only
to an “instrument of mass communication” because it did “not prohibit the spread by other
means of the identities of victims of sexual offenses [which] may have consequences as
devastating as the exposure of her name to large numbers of strangers”); Smith v. Daily Mail
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1979) (invalidating criminal statute directed only at
newspapers because harm sought to be prevented could also be caused by broadcast and
electronic media).
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tory speech is occurring and the court to be capable of coercing
compliance from those who are responsible for disseminating the
harmful speech. As to this second requirement, due to the broad
protections afforded to Internet intermediaries by § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, courts cannot enjoin or impose
liability on many of the parties that host, distribute, or otherwise
make such speech available online, including Facebook, Google, and
YouTube.369
An injunction likely would have its greatest utility in situations
where there is a danger of recurrent violation by the defendant and
the speech has not been widely disseminated. Surprisingly, a
number of defendants have actually conceded that they would
continue to defame the plaintiff absent a court order enjoining their
behavior.370 In such situations, an injunction prohibiting the
defendant from continuing to publish his defamatory speech might
be an effective remedy. Narrow tailoring necessitates, however, that
the injunction be limited to prohibiting the repetition of the specific
statements the court has found are defamatory, rather than
preventing all defamation in the future.371 
An injunction may also be a useful and appropriate remedy if the
defamatory material is only circulating within a limited community
and the injunction prohibits dissemination of the speech outside
that community. For example, if a defamatory statement has been
published in a print newspaper and the plaintiff seeks to prevent
the speech from being posted online or stored in an electronic
database where it would be accessible to a far wider audience, an
injunction may be effective at reducing the plaintiff’s harm.
Similarly, an injunction may be an effective remedy where the
defendant has created banners, distributed flyers, posted billboards,
or has otherwise communicated the defamatory speech only to a
limited audience.
In sum, before a court may issue an injunction it must assess
whether the information sought to be enjoined has been disclosed so
widely that it can no longer be effectively restrained through an
injunction. Judges should ask where and in what form the defama-
369. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
370. See, e.g., Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736 (2005); Balboa Island Vill. Inn v. Lemen,
156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007).
371. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
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tory speech has been published. Which audiences have access to the
speech? Has anyone republished the speech? Does the court have
jurisdiction over all necessary parties? The answers to these
questions will determine whether an injunction has any chance of
being effective. If the court can enforce its orders against the
speaker(s) and the speech has been limited in scope, duration,
medium, and recipients, then an injunction may be an effective
remedy.
CONCLUSION
Most constitutional law scholarship examining injunctions in
defamation cases has focused on the problems that arise when
courts issue preliminary injunctions restraining speech prior to
publication. To be sure, such injunctions raise significant First
Amendment concerns. But much of the current action in defamation
cases is in the area of post-publication injunctions, which raise
related, but in important ways different, challenges for courts. The
most pressing question is whether an injunction directed at
defamatory speech is ever permissible under the prior restraint
doctrine. Although we do not have a definitive answer from the
Supreme Court, it does appear that ground exists within the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence for narrowly tailored injunctions
directed at published speech that a court found defamatory.
This fertile ground has not gone uncolonized. As this Article
shows, a more permissive attitude toward injunctions in defamation
cases is emerging across the country. Although not all courts are
following this approach—and many remain confused about the
constitutional and equitable limits on injunctive relief—it is clear
that the adage that equity will not enjoin a libel is no longer an
accurate statement of the law. It is not clear, however, what rule
has replaced it. 
This Article argues that if there is to be a formal retreat from the
no-injunction rule, the First Amendment and equitable principles
necessitate that certain safeguards accompany injunctions directed
at defamatory speech. Although courts should be cautious when
granting injunctions, a limited form of injunctive relief would be
constitutional and consistent with equitable principles if it were
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limited solely to false statements on matters of private concern that
a court has found—after full adjudication—are defamatory.
